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**Pressure to increase investment is high now—power outages and economic problems**

**BBC 9/6**—“Venezuela’s economic woes: Sabotage or mismanagement?”, Irene Caselli, <http://www.americas-forum.com/venezuelas-economic-woes-sabotage-or-mismanagement/>) EL

Theories abound in Venezuela regarding Tuesday’s blackout which affected more than two-thirds of the country. While President Nicolas Maduro has accused political opponents of sabotaging the power system, the opposition blames government incompetence for the largest power cut in five years. As parts of the country are still facing problems with the electricity and the political finger-pointing continues, many are asking just how vulnerable Venezuela’s infrastructure is. The capital, Caracas, is not used to the power cuts which have become quite common in other regions. On Tuesday, cash machines, traffic lights and the underground stopped working. There was traffic chaos, with some people stuck in train carriages. ‘Lack of investment’ Thousands of workers poured into the streets, with many finding it hard to make their way down from upper floors when emergency lamps turned out to be faulty. Jose Manuel Puente, an economist at the IESA School of Management, says the power cut is a sign of a wider malaise. “Unfortunately what happened on Tuesday is similar to what’s happening to the country’s entire infrastructure. Investment in certain areas has been reduced to minimum under [Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian] revolution,” he explained. “What we see now is an inexorable consequence of over a decade of unbalanced economic policies.” Most supporters of the late president and his successor Nicolas Maduro would not agree with Mr Puente’s analysis. But even Finance Minister Nelson Merentes recently acknowledged that the economic policies followed by the government had not been successful. In a television interview broadcast on the weekend, he called for reforms to tackle structural economic problems. “This is a government that has won 18 elections, that has had social achievements,” he told TV channel Televen. “But it still has to be successful on the economy.”

**Maduro is working with investment capital both from the US and Venezuela now**

**Van Auken 6/7**-- politician and activist for the Socialist Equality Party (Bill, “Venezuela’s Maduro reaches out to big business and Washington”, 2013, <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/07/vene-j07.html>) EL

After three months in office, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, the handpicked successor of the late Hugo Chavez, has put aside left rhetoric to seek accommodation with Venezuela’s biggest capitalists as well as with the Obama administration in Washington. Maduro has repeatedly charged in recent months that US imperialism was conspiring to bring down his government and was the guiding hand behind a wave of political violence that followed his narrow election victory against right-wing candidate Henrique Capriles in April. Yet Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Elias Jaua was all smiles Wednesday, following a 40-minute meeting in Guatemala with US Secretary of State John Kerry. The two, who met privately on the sidelines of the Organization of American States General Assembly meeting in Antigua, Guatemala, declared their commitment to, in Kerry’s words, “establish a more constructive and positive relationship.” This is to include resuming the exchange of ambassadors, which has been suspended since late 2010. It was Venezuela that requested the meeting. “We agreed today there will be an ongoing, continuing dialogue between the State Department and the Foreign Ministry, and we will try to set out an agenda by which we agree on things we can work together,” said Kerry. For his part, Jaua declared that “A good relationship between the government of President Nicolas Maduro and the government of President Barack Obama is what suits both peoples, it’s the guarantee of peace and stability for our peoples.” Just last month, Maduro referred to Obama in a public speech as “the big boss of the devils” and accused him of backing the “fascist right” in attacking the Venezuelan people. In Guatemala, Jaua said that he had presented Kerry with a report on the violence that followed the April 14 election to choose Chavez’s successor in which 11 people were killed and 80 injured, most of them Maduro supporters. He gave the US secretary of state an extract of the report prepared on the incidents by Venezuela’s Public Advocate’s office. He said that the discussion had “alerted Kerry to the actions of anti-democratic groups in Venezuela, which threaten Venezuelan democracy, stability and which often are being supported by political and economic sectors of other countries.” In point of fact, the most significant “sectors” seeking to destabilize the Venezuelan regime have long been the CIA and the US State Department. Maduro’s turn toward accommodation with US imperialism has been accompanied by a similar approach to both foreign and domestic capital. Among the most significant deals in terms of foreign capital was reached late last month with Chevron Corp. Chevron is providing $2 billion in financing for Petroboscan, a joint venture between the US oil giant and Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA, to boost heavy crude production in the northwestern state of Zulia. Shortly beforehand, PDVSA secured a $1 billion credit line with Houston-based Schlumberger Ltd., the world’s largest oilfield services company. While oil exports to the US have declined to about 900,000 barrels a day, it remains Venezuela’s chief customer for oil, responsible for 95 percent of the country’s export earnings and roughly half of its federal budget revenue. From the standpoint of the US-based energy conglomerates, securing dominance over Venezuela’s oil reserves, the largest in the world, remains a strategic objective. The investments by Chevron and Schlumberger make clear that they see the potential for major profits, the Venezuelan government’s rhetoric about “Bolivarian socialism” notwithstanding. Domestically, after charging for months that major Venezuelan capitalists, backed by the US, were waging an “economic war” against his government, Maduro invited the country’s second-richest individual, Lorenzo Mendoza, the head of the country’s largest food company, Polar, to meet with him last month at the Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas. Both Chavez and Maduro had singled out Polar and Mendoza for attack over the country’s increasingly severe shortages and rising food prices. Holding them responsible for hoarding and waging an “economic war,” they threatened to nationalize the firm. For his part, Mendoza, who is worth some $4.5 billion, was an enthusiastic supporter of the US-backed coup that briefly unseated Chavez in April 2002. This history had contributed to his keeping a fairly low profile under Chavez, but it was noted in the Venezuelan media that he mounted a vigorous public defense of his company in the face of Maduro’s recent charges. Mendoza described the meeting as “very cordial, direct, sincere,” adding, “The president was very kind in listening to us and communicating the need to keep investing, producing and supplying markets. That is our lifelong commitment, passion and vocation.” He said that the two had reached an agreement “not to politicize” the issue of food. Vice President Jorge Arreaza provided a similar description of the encounter between the “working class” president and the billionaire. “The problem’s been overcome,” he said. The meeting with Mendoza was only the most visible of a series of talks between the government and prominent Venezuelan capitalists. Among the deals reached is the lifting of certain price controls and the easing of currency restrictions. “In another sign of the rapprochement, the hallways of the finance ministry for the first time in years are filled with businessmen in sharp suits,” Reuters reported. “Many carry folders stuffed with requests for greater flexibility in the currency control system and an easing of price controls.” The news agency quoted Finance Minister Nelson Merentes stating after one meeting with business executives: “We’ve entered a phase of creating closer ties with the private sector, without ignoring the new socialist economy.” After months of charging the big bourgeoisie in Venezuela with “sabotage,” the Maduro government is now currying its favor and begging it to increase production. This turn is driven by a deepening economic crisis characterized by a decline in growth, soaring inflation and widespread shortages. Venezuela’s inflation rate is now near 30 percent, with the bulk of it reflecting the sharp rise in the price of food. Meanwhile, the growth rate for the first quarter of 2013 amounted to just 0.7 percent. This overall figure, however, masks the severity of the situation. Venezuela’s financial sector, which continues to enjoy some of the highest profit rates in the world, saw a 31 percent growth during this period, while manufacturing declined by 3.6 percent and construction by 1.2 percent. The scarcity index, which tracks the amount of products missing from store shelves, has hit its highest level since the Central Bank began tracking these figures. The accommodation between the Maduro government and Venezuelan capitalists, on the one hand, and Washington, on the other, has taken the political wind out of the sails of the rightist candidate Henrique Capriles, who has continued to charge electoral fraud and condemn Maduro as an illegitimate president. While the Obama administration has yet to formally recognize Maduro’s close election victory, it has turned a cold shoulder to demands for OAS sanctions against Venezuela. And Mendoza’s visit to Miraflores indicates that the billionaire accepts Maduro as legitimate. Clearly, both domestic and foreign capital recognize that behind the left rhetoric and the limited social reforms of “Bolivarian Socialism,” Maduro’s government defends capitalism and they can do business with it. More fundamentally, continued agitation by the right wing and a further weakening of the government under conditions of deepening economic crisis and rising popular discontent poses the danger of provoking a social explosion in the working class.

## Apocalyptic Rhetoric (environ)

**Changing representational practices hinders understanding of policy by overlooking questions of agency and material structures**

**Tuathail, 96**-(Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

**Saying warming is threat to global environment doesn’t equal normal securitization**

**Floyd 7**

Rita, PhD in Poli Sci, Fellow @ the Institute for Environmental Security & Fellow @ the Department of Politics and International Studies @ U of Warwick “Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security: bringing together the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of security studies” Review of International Studies (2007), 33, 327–350

It exceeds the scope of this article to lay out the specifics for positive/ negative thoroughly for all five sectors to security as identified by Buzan, to exemplify; however, the following will show what such a spectrum, from positive to negative, might look like in the environmental sector. At this point it is important to note that the spectrums from positive to negative might differ strongly in the individual sectors. Particularly because in the other security sectors, the analyst is likely to deal with different groups of human beings, as opposed to a non-human entity like the environment in the environmental sector, principles for positive/negative, in evaluating consequences, will have to take into account the relational nature of security, whereby one actor’s security is another actor’s insecurity. This article must thus merely be seen as a first tentative stab into the direction of a security evaluation that aims to utilise the role of the analyst as an inevitable securitising actor, by focusing on the consequentialist dimension of securitisation/desecuritisation. Before outlining the positive/negative spectrum in the environmental security sector, it is necessary to explain what the environmental security sector entails. In the environmental security sector there are numerous conceptualisations of environmental security, making ‘environmental security’ an essentially contested concept. As for all security studies, the differences in the way environmental security is conceptualised are based on the following central underlying issues: Security for whom? Security from what? And who provides security? On the basis of these underlying issues, it is possible to group the numerous individual approaches into two overarching distinct schools of thought on environmental security. 51 The first school constitutes the majority of the literature and focuses on existential threats to the state caused by an ill-functioning environment, the link between environmental degradation and/or environmental scarcity and the onset of intrastate and interstate conflict, and on the role of the military in the provision of environmental security.52 This broad approach to environmental security has two main characteristics: first, the state is the referent object of security; and second, the state is the provider of security as environmental security. This state-centric approach to environmental security is very much in line with the mainstream approaches to International Relations theory, in which the focus is on the security of the state, and where security is ultimately about state survival. The second main perspective in the literature conceptualises environmental security as non-violent environmental/demographic security.53 In this understanding the referent object of environmental security is the individual and the nature of the threat stems from the dangers of long-term environmental degradation, such as global warming, species extinction, pollution of air and water, loss of biodiversity and ozone depletion, that are non-violent in character. In this approach, environmental security can be usefully defined as: ‘The process of peacefully reducing human vulnerability to human-induced environmental degradation by addressing the root causes of environmental degradation and human insecurity’.54 This conceptualisation of environmental security argues largely against the linkage between environmental degradation and conflict, and against the national and state-centric provision of security. Instead, this approach to environmental security is founded on concerns about issues such as ecological interdependence, the unsuitability of the state system for addressing transnational problems, human rights and joint value systems. In this understanding, the nation state is no longer a sufficient provider of environmental security, but rather shifts the concept of environmental security away from national to common or global security. This approach to the concept of environmental security is thus directly opposed to the state-centric understanding of environmental security, arguing instead that the concept is ultimately more compatible with the concept of human security. In the literature, this second approach is commonly referred to as the ‘human security approach to environmental security’.55

**The plan over comes apocalyptic fear -- coupling our rhetoric with a solution solves**

**Feinberg and Willer 11** - Psychology Dept and Sociology Dept, UC Berkeley (Matthew and Robb, "Apocalypse Soon? Dire Messages Reduce Belief in Global Warming by Contradicting Just-World Beliefs", Psychological Science January 2011 vol. 22 no. 1 34-38)//KL

These results demonstrate how dire messages warning of the severity of global warming and its presumed dangers can backfire, paradoxically increasing skepticism about global warming by contradicting individuals’ deeply held beliefs that the world is fundamentally just. In addition, we found evidence that this dire messaging led to reduced intentions among participants to reduce their carbon footprint – an effect driven by their increased global warming skepticism. Our results imply that because dire messaging regarding global warming is at odds with the strongly established cognition that the world is fair and stable, people may dismiss the factual content of messages that emphasize global warming’s dire consequences. But if the same messages are delivered coupled with a potential solution, it allows the information to be communicated without creating substantial threat to these individuals’ deeply held beliefs. Our findings extend past research showing that fear-based appeals, especially when not coupled with a clear solution, can backfire and undermine the intended effects of messages (Witte, 1992; 1994). In addition, our results complement recent research showing that framing environmentalism as patriotic can successfully increase proenvironmental behavioral intentions in those most attached to the status quo (Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010). Taken together, these findings stress the importance of framing global warming messages so they do not contradict individuals’ deeply held beliefs. Additionally, our results suggest that reducing individuals’ just world beliefs could result in decreased global warming skepticism. Although we were able to manipulate such beliefs in Study 2, it remains to be seen how just world beliefs could be

**The inclusion of hypothetical impact scenarios supercharges the deliberative process by providing a normative means of assessing consequences**

**Larsen and Ostling 9** ([Katarina Larsen](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science?_ob=RedirectURL&_method=outwardLink&_partnerName=27983&_origin=article&_zone=art_page&_linkType=scopusAuthorDocuments&_targetURL=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.scopus.com%2Fscopus%2Finward%2Fauthor.url%3FpartnerID%3D10%26rel%3D3.0.0%26sortField%3Dcited%26sortOrder%3Dasc%26author%3DLarsen,%2520Katarina%26authorID%3D8530067600%26md5%3D803d61c0f6edf0f22764881c1d5c4815&_acct=C000007678&_version=1&_userid=99318&md5=769a48548565b8a587aa911831b3e3dc), a KTH – Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Philosophy and History of Technology, Division of History of Science and Technology, Teknikringen 76, SE-100 44 Stockholm, Sweden, [Ulrika Gunnarsson-Östling](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science?_ob=RedirectURL&_method=outwardLink&_partnerName=27983&_origin=article&_zone=art_page&_linkType=scopusAuthorDocuments&_targetURL=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.scopus.com%2Fscopus%2Finward%2Fauthor.url%3FpartnerID%3D10%26rel%3D3.0.0%26sortField%3Dcited%26sortOrder%3Dasc%26author%3DGunnarsson-%25C3%2596stling,%2520Ulrika%26authorID%3D25651733400%26md5%3D68be8a4d6c64737f5374da365b28631e&_acct=C000007678&_version=1&_userid=99318&md5=437ee99ba2fd8dbf33ad1021018b7a09), KTH – Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Planning and Environment, Division of Environmental Strategies Research, Drottning Kristinas väg 30, SE-100 44 Stockholm, Sweden, “Climate change scenarios and citizen-participation: Mitigation and adaptation perspectives in constructing sustainable futures,” Volume 33, Issue 3, July 2009, Pages 260–266, Science Direct)

In constructing normative scenarios a set of images are generated illustrating future ways of living, travelling and consuming products and services where certain goal such as a reduced climate impact is fulfilled. These are not predictions of the future, but can be used as a way to act in accordance to achieving a desired future development. They can also be a contribution to the general debate or foundations for policy decisions. These scenarios also often include an account of changes in terms of consumption patterns and behavioural change. In this sense, these scenarios are extended beyond socio-economic predictions and relations to environmental load dealt within other field, such as climate change predictions in the work of IPCC. The scenarios in focus here build on some predictive elements, but in addition the sustainability focus when including behavioural change also includes some normative elements as how to achieve a sustainable society in the future. In essence, this also means that images of behavioural change are included, but not necessary including explanations on how these changes came about ([Larsen & Höjer, 2007](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib24)). The behavioural change is there formulated by describing level of acceptance (of introducing a new environmental tax) or new behaviour in daily travel patterns (new modes of transport). However, even though scenario construction is often a creative process including a range of participants demanding change, trust is built and ideas exchanged, these processes are seldom analyzed as deliberative processes. Deliberation takes places in communicative processes where participants with diverse opinions, but open to preference shifts, are seen as equal (see [Hendriks, Dryzek, & Hunold, 2007](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib20)). Process values such as learning and mutual understanding are created in addition to outputs such as policies. Experiences from exploring transition pathways towards sustainability distinguish between process management aspects of learning (learns how?), learning about policy options and the context in which decisions take place (learns what?), the subjects of learning (who learns?), and the results of learning ([Van de Kerkhof & Wieczorek, 2005](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib38): 735). Especially questions such as who takes part in the process and whom these participants are to represent become important since the scenarios often expect great behavioural changes. Is it legitimate to expect all people to change even if they did not feel as they were represented? It is important to keep in mind that scenario making processes are not set up only to share ideas and create mutual understanding, they aim at solving specific targets such as minimizing climate change. Some writers (e.g. [Hendriks et al., 2007](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib20)) underline the importance of deliberative processes being open and diverse and do not put as much attention to the outcome. Understanding the importance of legitimacy we see the process as crucial, but aiming for goals such as minimized climate change both the content and the impact of the output are also critical. Thus, we agree with [Connelly and Richardson (in press)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib13) seeing effective deliberation as a process where stakeholders are engaged and the primary assessment should be regarding the process' “effectiveness in delivering an intended policy”. They also underline that governance as a whole should be assessed regarding its possibilities to take action and achieve legitimacy, where legitimacy is understood as “the recognised right to make policy” ([Connelly & Richardson, in press](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib13)). There are thus three dimensions [Connelly and Richardson (in press)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib13) find important: content sustainability, capacity to act and legitimacy. We believe those dimensions are also important for participatory processes generating scenarios aiming at mitigation as well as adaptation to climate change, otherwise they will not have any strong (and legitimate) impact on development. [Hendriks et al. (2007)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib20) make an important distinction between partisan and non-partisan forums. We believe this distinction is important also when analysing scenario generating processes since it affects the legitimacy of the outcome. Partisans can be activists or belong to interest groups, organisations or associations, which strive for particular matters. Partisans are thus committed to certain agendas and are therefore often seen as poor deliberators ([Hendriks et al., 2007](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672%22%20%5Cl%20%22bib20): 362). However, from a democracy perspective they are seen as important since they legitimate processes by making sure that particular stakes are represented. While partisan forums are made up to represent interest groups in society, non-partisan forums consist of randomly selected citizens, which ideally have rather open preferences. When exploring one partisan and one non-partisan process [Hendriks et al. (2007)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib20) found that contrary to common expectations, partisan forums can have substantial legitimacy and impact problems. They also found that non-partisan forums might be favourable in deliberative capacity but they might fall short in external legitimacy and policy impact. The fact was that partisan participants accepted that deliberation means that you must be willing to adjust preferences, but they failed to do so ([Hendriks et al., 2007](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672%22%20%5Cl%20%22bib20): 370). Both the partisan and non-partisan forums included participants who stuck to their positions, but non-partisan participants had greater autonomy “so their deliberative capacity can be judged superior to that of partisan forums” ([Hendriks et al., 2007](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672%22%20%5Cl%20%22bib20): 371). In the study by [Hendriks et al. (2007: 372)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib20) legitimacy is defined and operationalized as: “the extent to which key-actors, decision-makers and the media accept and support the procedure and its outcomes.” In other words, the legitimacy (as defined in that study) is grounded on actors largely outside the forums active in the deliberation processes. This study also showed (by interviews of experts themselves) that the deliberation by citizens and capacity of lay people was questioned by some experts ([Hendriks et al., 2007](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672%22%20%5Cl%20%22bib20): 373–374). In addition to this distinction of external legitimacy, the concept of legitimacy is in the literature largely divided in strategic and institutional legitimacy ([Suchman, 1995](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672%22%20%5Cl%20%22bib34): 572). The strategic tradition stresses the managerial standpoint in how organisations making legitimate strategies resulting in manipulating to gain societal support. Hence, rather than emphasising participatory processes (and the inherent process values), these values and the participatory process can be by-passed by e.g. “astroturfing”[1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#fn1) or other strategic options adopted. The branch of institutional studies of legitimacy, instead, emphasizes the “normative and cognitive forces that constrain, construct, and empower the organizational actors” as described in [Suchman (1995: 571)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib34) examining the two approaches. The conclusion of this examination of the two parallel domains of research on legitimacy concludes three categories: pragmatic (based on audience self-interest), moral (based on normative approval) and cognitive (based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness). In practical cases one of these categories can be more protruding or legitimacy being a blend of these three. The external legitimacy category, discussed previously, share some common traits with the audience self-interest category (labelled pragmatic) in the sense that actors external to the deliberative process (the audience consisting of experts and media) has a strong saying in the legitimate value of the outcome. The constellations of forums and involvement of stakeholders in governance processes is also featured in studies recognised as communicative planning theory ([Healey, 1996](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib18)) and the question also becomes relevant when implementing future-oriented development in European metropolitan regions ([Healey, 2000](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib19)).[Campbell (2006)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib5) underlines that conceptualization of justice in contemporary planning theory is much about procedural concerns. However, individual liberties may be in conflict or as [Campbell (2006: 95)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib5) puts it: “In relation to planning matters, the nature of interests is often complex and problematic; for example, individuals generally both desire clean air and to be able to drive their car(s) freely. Our preferences are therefore often inconsistent and overlapping.” Also the previous work with Swedish futures studies construction in the 1960–1970s having aims at democratic scenario construction by proposing a “particular responsibility to society's weakest groups” ([Andersson, 2006](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672%22%20%5Cl%20%22bib2): 288). At that time these groups were discussed in terms of the “weakest groups” (including the poor, elderly, unemployed and the disabled). Other examples of relevance when discussing communication among actors can be found in game theory ([Sally, 1995](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib30)). Conditions where reciprocity and trust can help overcome self-interests are built by “cheap talk”. As we will see, content sustainability, capacity to act and legitimacy are intimately connected. Findings from studies of collective actions frequently find that “when the users of a common-pool resource organize themselves to devise and enforce some of their own basic rules, they tend to manage local resources more sustainably than when rules are externally imposed on them” ([Ostrom, 2000](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672%22%20%5Cl%20%22bib29): 148). Common-pool resources are in this case understood as “natural or humanly created systems that generate a finite flow of benefits where it is costly to exclude beneficiaries and one person's consumption subtracts from the amount of benefits available to others” ([Ostrom, 2000](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672%22%20%5Cl%20%22bib29): 148). The explanation from game theory is that individuals obtain results that are “better than rational” when they are allowed to communicate, or do “cheap talk” as some economists call it (see e.g. [Ostrom, 1998](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0197397508000672#bib28)). In other words, communicative approaches can make collaboration work better since people have the possibility to bond with each other. From this reasoning we conclude that in a process where participants are active, open to preference shifts and are allowed to actually influence the result, both the content sustainability and the capacity to act might increase. However, similar reasoning about legitimacy of these processes suggests that people who are not allowed (by some reason) to take part in the process might not experience the result as legitimate. Thus, the external legitimacy might be low.

## 2ac

**It’s dead – finance fights thump it, the GOP opposes, and vote is November in the best case**

**Palmer, 9/17/13** (Anne, Politco, “Outside groups try to revive immigration reform” <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/outside-groups-try-to-revive-immigration-reform-96950.html?hp=r2>)

Nancy Pelosi is huddling with Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, top labor leaders and former AOL executive Steve Case in separate meetings this week as supporters of immigration reform try to revive the issue, which fast seems to be dying on Capitol Hill.

Their goal: get legislation moving in the House again before the Thanksgiving recess.

Proponents concede that it’s a heavy lift and that Republican lawmakers didn’t come out of the August recess ready to act. The Syria debate and now the battle over whether to fund the government and hike the debt ceiling are the top priorities in the GOP-controlled House, whose rank and file are already skeptical of immigration reform. Putting immigration back on the front burner is going to be tough, especially right before the 2014 elections when Republicans won’t be eager to be seen as agreeing with President Barack Obama’s agenda.

But immigration supporters aren’t going down without a fight.

“We have to remind them that this matters and there will be a price to pay if they don’t do anything,” said Tamar Jacoby, a veteran immigration reform supporter who is the president and CEO of the business group ImmigrationWorks.

**Too soon to tell for this to be a real disad and she might not even be nominated**

**Credit Writedowns, 9/16/13**  - investment website (“Yellen’s nomination is not a done deal” <http://www.creditwritedowns.com/2013/09/yellens-nomination-is-not-a-done-deal.html>)

Of course the next obvious candidate is Janet Yellen, who is a highly accomplished economist but is thought to be even more dovish than Ben Bernanke. This took the markets by surprise, sending equities, precious metals, and “risk-on” currencies higher. Treasuries rallied as well on expectations of a more dovish Fed policy. Oil fell on a potential diplomatic solution for Syria.

But is this rally a bit premature? Here are some potential issues with taking the Yellen nomination for granted:

1. President Obama tends to select candidates for key posts that he knows and often had worked with in the past. Neither he nor other senior members of the administration know Yellen well or had worked with her in any capacity.

2. Obama will be looking for someone who had demonstrated strong ability to deal with a major crisis. While Yellen is certainly capable and had accomplished a great deal during the financial crisis, there will be questions raised about her ability to lead the central bank and the financial system through another 2008.

3. Janet Yellen’s dovish views could galvanize a number of House Republicans, setting the administration up for another damaging confirmation fight.

CS: – Yellen’s rhetoric occasionally comes across as more dovish than Bernanke’s, and some wonder whether, as chair, she would advocate tolerating a higher rate of inflation in pursuit of job growth.

As of this weekend, the president’s job approval remains relatively low. The administration may not want to rock the boat by nominating someone they may deem to be controversial. That is the reason they dropped Larry Summers to begin with.

**The budget fight comes before the debt ceiling and costs capital**

**Koring, 9/16/13** (Paul, The Globe and Mail (Canada), “Obama faces fall clash with Congress;

Despite averting military action in Syria, U.S. President fights plunging approval ratings and feuding Republicans on Capitol Hill” lexis)

With war against Syria averted, or perhaps postponed, U.S. President Barack Obama can turn again to September's anticipated battles against his still-implacable Republican opponents.

Looming is a Sept. 30 deadline for Congress to fund ongoing government operations - everything from food stamps to new bullets - and a showdown is shaping up between a weakened President and Republicans riven by their own divisions.

Then, some time in October, the U.S. Treasury will face another crisis as it reaches its borrowing limit. Without an increase, which some Republicans want to block, the U.S. government could face default. Meanwhile, hopes for progress on major policy initiatives such as immigration reform, long expected to be the big legislative issue this fall, are fading.

As hostile as relations are, some observers suggest the averted showdown over Syria - it's now widely accepted that Congress would have rejected Mr. Obama's call for an authorization of force had it gone to a vote - didn't make things any worse.

"We don't know what September would have looked like in the absence of the Syria issue, but my guess is that it would have looked an awful lot like it looks today," said Sarah Binder, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, which watches Congress closely.

"These divisions over spending and size of government have been with us all along, and the [Republican] opposition to Obama has been quite strong all along. ... Set aside the issue of Syria, and really nothing has changed."

**If immigration passes, it is because of the Hispanic vote—winners win**

Michael **Hirsch 13**, chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to 2012 Decoded. Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau. He was also Newsweek’s Washington web editor and authored a weekly column for Newsweek.com, “The World from Washington.” Earlier on, he was Newsweek’s foreign editor, guiding its award-winning coverage of the September 11 attacks and the war on terror. He has done on-the-ground reporting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places around the world, and served as the Tokyo-based Asia Bureau Chief for Institutional Investor from 1992 to 1994. http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶ ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ¶ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.” Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

**Private contractors hired to implement the plan causes fraud**

**West 7** (Bill, Chief of the National Security Section – Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Immigration “Reform” Will Be National Security Disaster”, 5-17, http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/ 05/immigration\_reform\_will\_be\_nat.php)

CIS has indicated it would need to bring in private contractor personnel to help deal with the monumental workload increase from reform legislation. Such contractors will invariably be quickly hired, poorly trained, probably low-bid, barely vetted and far more subject to bribery and corruption than permanent Government employees. Not that bribery and corruption will necessarily be that necessary. In short order, the system will be overwhelmed. Whatever minimal fraud detection and prevention safeguards might be erected won’t last long in the face of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of applications and petitions to be adjudicated. What that means is the information provided on those applications and petitions, and whatever supporting documents they may have (if any), will essentially be taken at face value. Whatever the applicant alien tells the adjudicator will essentially be taken at face value. There will be little time or process available to verify anything, perhaps beyond running the applicant’s name through a standard battery of computer databases (and, even that may become so time consuming some will slip through the cracks).

**No cyberterror.**

**Libicki, 8/16** - Senior Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation and a Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy (Martin C., "Don't Buy the Cyberhype," Foreign Affairs, 8-16-13, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139819/martin-c-libicki/dont-buy-the-cyberhype?page=show, SMS)

These days, most of Washington seems to believe that a major cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure is inevitable. In March, James Clapper, U.S. director of national intelligence, ranked cyberattacks as the greatest short-term threat to U.S. national security. General Keith Alexander, the head of the U.S. Cyber Command, recently characterized “cyber exploitation” of U.S. corporate computer systems as the “greatest transfer of wealth in world history.” And in January, a report by the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board argued that cyber risks should be managed with improved defenses and deterrence, including “a nuclear response in the most extreme case.” Although the risk of a debilitating cyberattack is real, the perception of that risk is far greater than it actually is. No person has ever died from a cyberattack, and only one alleged cyberattack has ever crippled a piece of critical infrastructure, causing a series of local power outages in Brazil. In fact, a major cyberattack of the kind intelligence officials fear has not taken place in the 21 years since the Internet became accessible to the public. Thus, while a cyberattack could theoretically disable infrastructure or endanger civilian lives, its effects would unlikely reach the scale U.S. officials have warned of. The immediate and direct damage from a major cyberattack on the United States could range anywhere from zero to tens of billions of dollars, but the latter would require a broad outage of electric power or something of comparable damage. Direct casualties would most likely be limited, and indirect causalities would depend on a variety of factors such as whether the attack disabled emergency 911 dispatch services. Even in that case, there would have to be no alternative means of reaching first responders for such an attack to cause casualties. The indirect effects might be greater if a cyberattack caused a large loss of confidence, particularly in the banking system. Yet scrambled records would probably prove insufficient to incite a run on the banks.

## 2ac oil generic

**No link to oil—the plan can exempt specific sectors**

**REIL 07**--Renewable Energy and International Law (REIL) is an international policy and law network at Yale, bringing together the business and finance communities, policymakers, scholars, lawyers, and science and technology experts to create enabling legislative and policy frameworks for clean energy on the international, national, and subnational levels (“From Barriers to Opportunities:

Renewable Energy Issues in Law and Policy”, <http://environment.research.yale.edu/documents/downloads/o-u/REIL-Report.pdf>) EL

Because the energy sector is typically highly regulated, often with signiﬁcant government ownership, and central to the economy, it is not unusual for IIAs speciﬁcally to exclude the energy sector. In these situations, a sector-speciﬁc agreement, such as the ECT, can be used (see Section 3.2.1). These agreements may confuse an already complex investment market, but also may “facilitate the horizontal integration across policy areas; thus investment policy-trade policy and investment policy-technology policy linkages can be address on a sectoral basis.” (Brewer, 1998). The potential implications of these standards of treatment for renewable energy policies are discussed in Section 5.2 below.

**Speculators determine the price of oil**

**CHARLESTON GAZETTE 2011** (“Cables show Saudi Arabia often warned U.S. about oil speculators,” May 26, Lexis)

When oil prices hit a record $147 a barrel in July 2008, the Bush administration leaned on Saudi Arabia to pump more crude in hopes that a flood of new crude would drive the price down. The Saudis complied, but not before warning that oil already was plentiful and that Wall Street speculation, not a shortage of oil, was driving up prices.

Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi even told U.S. Ambassador Ford Fraker that the kingdom would have difficulty finding customers for the additional crude, according to an account laid out in a confidential State Department cable dated Sept. 28, 2008.

"Saudi Arabia can't just put crude out on the market," the cable quotes al-Naimi as saying. Instead, al-Naimi suggested, "speculators bore significant responsibility for the sharp increase in oil prices in the last few years," according to the cable.

What role Wall Street investors play in the high cost of oil is a hotly debated topic in Washington. Despite weak demand, the price of a barrel of crude oil surged more than 25 percent in the past year, reaching a peak of $113 May 2 before falling back to a range of $95 to $100 a barrel.

The Obama administration, the Bush administration before it and Congress have been slow to take steps to rein in speculators. On Tuesday, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, a U.S. regulatory agency, charged a group of financial firms with manipulating the price of oil in 2008. But the commission hasn't enacted a proposal to limit the percentage of oil contracts a financial company can hold, while Congress remains focused primarily on big oil companies, threatening in hearings last week to eliminate their tax breaks because of the $38 billion in first-quarter profits the top six U.S. companies earned.

The Saudis, however, have struck a steady theme for years that something should be done to curb the influence of banks and hedge funds that are speculating on the price of oil, according to diplomatic cables made available to McClatchy Newspapers by the WikiLeaks website.

The cables show that the subject of speculation has been raised in working group meetings between U.S. and Saudi officials, in one-on-one meetings with American diplomats and at least once with former President George W. Bush himself.

One cable recounts how Dr. Majid al-Moneef, Saudi Arabia's OPEC governor, explained what he thought was the full impact of speculation to U.S. Rep. Alan Grayson, D-Fla., who in July 2009 was in Saudi Arabia for the first time.

According to the cable, al-Moneef said Saudi Arabia suspected that "speculation represented approximately $40 of the overall oil price when it was at its height."

Asked how to curb such speculation, al-Moneef suggested "improving transparency" - a reference to the fact that most oil trading is conducted outside regulated markets - and better communication among the world's commodity markets so that oil speculators can't hide the full extent of their trading positions.

Al-Moneef also suggested that the U.S. consider "position limits" - restrictions on how much of the oil market a company can control - something the CFTC is considering. But the proposal to prevent any single trader from accumulating more than 10 percent of the oil contracts being traded hasn't received final approval, and the CFTC also has yet to define what it considers excessive speculation.

Another confidential document from the embassy in Riyadh, dated Feb. 14, 2007, indicates that Saudi officials had concluded years ago that speculation played at least as big a role in setting oil prices as traditional issues of supply and demand did.

Recounting the presentation by Yasser Mufti, a planner for Aramco, at a conference of U.S. and Saudi officials, the cable said: "The Saudi analysis indicated a link between higher oil prices and the influx of investor funds into the oil markets."

Indeed, the cable noted, "As the oil futures markets play an increasingly large role in setting world oil prices, (Mufti) remarked his team was now obtaining better insights into prospective oil prices from banks than from those working in the real oil sector, such as refiners."

A McClatchy investigation earlier this month showed the extent to which financial institutions now influence the price of oil. Until recently, end users of oil - such as airlines, refineries and other consumers of fuel - accounted for about 70 percent of oil trading as they tried to hedge against price fluctuations.

Today, however, speculators who will never take possession of a barrel of oil account for that 70 percent of oil futures trading, and the volume of speculative trading has grown fivefold.

That's why the Air Transport Association, in a filing March 28 to the CFTC, called for aggressive curbs on speculators. The association complained of rapidly climbing jet fuel prices, which have outpaced the rapid climb in crude prices and have reached their highest point since September 2008, right before the near-collapse of the U.S. economy.

"At the same time, according to data recently released by the commission, speculators have increased their positions in energy markets by 64 percent compared to June 2008, bringing speculation to the highest level on record," wrote David Berg, the airline group's chief lawyer.

**Spare Saudi capacity will stabilize oil markets:**

Sangim **Han,** 4/26/20**11** (Business Week, “Saudi Arabia ‘Not Comfortable’ With Oil Price, Al-Falih Says” <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-04-26/saudi-arabia-not-comfortable-with-oil-price-al-falih-says.html>)

Oil consumers needn’t be concerned by high crude prices because spare capacity can “moderate” the market, said al- Falih, who is in South Korea for a board meeting this week. Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi “has made it clear that the kingdom will continue to act in **support of oil market stability**,” al-Falih said. The minister on April 19 described the recent gains in prices as “unjustified.”

**No impact to Russian economic decline**

**COUNTRY FORECAST SELECT 3-8-2010** (Economist Intelligence Unit, Lexis)

However, although Russians are dissatisfied with the economic situation, this does not yet appear to have affected significantly the popular standing of either Mr Medvedev or Mr Putin. Although the impact of economic crises on social stability usually occurs with a lag, it is nevertheless doubtful that a rise in social discontent could threaten the leadership--Boris Yeltsin managed to survive politically through the crisis in 1998, despite being in a much weaker position. Although some independent labour groups have emerged, most trade union organisations are close to the government. The authorities face little threat from a weak opposition. The liberals in Russia are in disarray and are not represented in parliament. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF)--the only true opposition party in parliament--is a declining force.

**aff vs rowland hall**

## 2ac dedev

**Growth is inherently sustainable – capitalism provides an incentive to preserve resources – eventual high prices will curb consumption – triggers a mindset shift towards sustainability without collapse**

**Cudd, 11** (Ann E., Professor of Philosophy, Associate Dean for Humanities, University of Kansas, “Capitalism, For and Against - A Feminist Debate,” Cambridge University Press, Section 3, Tashma)

I agree with Professor Holmstrom that we should be very concerned with pollution, and particularly with climate change, but in my view, this points us toward private ownership of property and not collective ownership of scarce resources. As has been proven repeatedly by experience, and as is clear from theory as well. When goods are collectively owned they are subject to the problem known as the "tragedy of the commons.” The tragedy of the commons is the overuse of a scarce resource that happens because no one has the incentive to preserve and protect the resource for the long term. Common ownership sets up a race to use the resource before it is used up by someone else, or exhausted. Even with the best of intentions on one’s own part, if one cannot be sure that others will preserve and protect the resource, then it is only rational to make full use of it while it lasts. In game theoretic terms it is like a "prisoner's dilemma" in which there is no equilibrium strategy that would counsel preservation of the resource; anyone who refrains from using the resource in order to preserve it for later generations would be played for a sucker. Real world examples abound of the tragedy of the commons: the depletion of the world's ocean fisheries; overpollution of the atmosphere; overgrazing of common pasturelands; over-gathering of firewood. This last is a particular tragedy in many places in Africa today for women, where they must search farther and farther from home to find enough fuel. Private ownership of property provides owners with an incentive to preserve their property for the long term, It is precisely the ability to exclude others from using it that allows one the security to be able to invest in it, by improving the pasture, protecting the trees, refraining from fishing at times, or taking only the mature animals. No one worries that cattle, which are owned privately and therefore cultivated, will disappear after all. But we are very worried about the disappearance of cod in the North Atlantic. Private ownership allows one to sell the good in the market, if and only if, those who would consume the good are willing to pay the price that reflects the relative scarcity of the good and the expense of preserving it. The ability to own a competing resource privately and sell it means that alternatives can be cultivated as well, which removes some of the pressure from the more scarce, and therefore more expensive, privately owned good.

**Transition fails—psychology makes desire for economic growth inevitable**

**Friedman 5** (Benjamin M. Friedman, William Joseph Maier Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University, former Chair of the Department of Economics at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University, 2005 (“Rising Incomes, Individual Attitudes, and the Politics of Social Change,” The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Published by Knopf Publishing Group, ISBN 0679448918, p. 80-82)

The key is that while everybody of course wants to have more income [end page 80] so as to enjoy a higher standard of living, better health, and a greater sense of security, our sense of what constitutes “more” for any of these purposes is mostly relative. Whenever people are asked how well off they think they are, they almost always respond by comparing their lives to some kind of reference point. 4 Further, whether most people think what they have or how they live constitutes “more” or “less” depends on how their circumstances compare to two separate benchmarks: their own (or their family’s) past experience, and how they see people around them living. The principal driving force underlying the positive influence that economic growth has over people’s attitudes, and through the political process therefore over the character of their society, is the interaction between how each of these two respective points of comparison affects people’s perceptions. Obviously nothing can enable the majority of the population to be better off than everyone else. But not only is it possible for most people to be better off than they used to be, that is precisely what economic growth means. The central question is whether, when people see that they are doing well (in other words, enjoying “more”) compared to the benchmark of their own prior experience, or their parents’—or when they believe that their children’s lives will be better still— they consequently feel less need to get ahead compared to other people. If so, then the reduced importance they attach to living better than others leads in the end to more wide-ranging benefits, for the society as a whole, whenever general living standards are increasing. Happiness depends, of course, on more than just money and the things money can buy. In surveys, most people say that their sense of satisfaction with their lives depends most on the strength of their family relationships and personal friendships, or their health, or their education, or their religious attachment, or their feeling of connection to a broader community beyond their own family, or their sense of being engaged in purposeful and productive work, or even on their everyday work environment. 5 In many surveys the single most important influence on adults’ happiness is whether they are married. (People who are, or who are living together as if they were, are typically happier.) 6 People with “extrovert” personalities also tend to be happier on average, perhaps simply because they have more friends. 7 Money matters too, however. People with more income typically enjoy not just a higher standard of living in terms of food, clothing, and housing but also better health (in part because of better access to medical care, but also because they drink and smoke less and get more exercise). They also have better educations and a stronger sense of security in the face of major life uncertainties. Familiar popular images of the business rat race [end page 81] notwithstanding, people with higher incomes on average also have more leisure time, and they mostly spend it in activities that foster the friendships they then say (in surveys) matter far more than money. Having at least some financial resources is even helpful in maintaining marriages, perhaps because it allows young couples to live on their own instead of with their parents. 8 At any given time, within a given country, people with lower incomes are far more likely to say that they are unhappy. 9 But the essential point is that how much income it takes to enjoy advantages like these is a relative matter, and the most obvious benchmark people have in mind when they draw such comparisons is their own past experience. People who live better now than they did before, or better than they recall their parents living, are likely to think they are doing well. Those who look back on better times— better for them and their families, that is— think they are not. As a result, psychological studies have repeatedly confirmed that people’s satisfaction depends less on the level of their income than on how it is changing. 10 But rising incomes are, in turn, what economic growth is all about.\* \* (footnote) The idea that satisfaction depends primarily on changes in economic well-being (to the extent that economic factors are important in this regard) is hardly new. Adam Smith observed that “all men, sooner or later, accommodate themselves to whatever becomes their permanent situation.” Hence “between one permanent situation and another, there [is], with regard to real happiness, no essential difference” (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 149). Moreover, Smith claimed no originality for this view but attributed it to the Stoic philosophers of ancient Greece.

## china

**US economic ties inevitable – engagement not zero sum.**

**Dumbaugh et al 5. [**Kerry, specialist in Asian Affairs, Mark Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American affairs, "China's growing interest in Latin America" CRS Report for Congress -- April 20 -- www.au.af.mil/AU/AWC/AWCGATE/crs/rs22119.pdf]

Other observers contend that Chinese activity in Latin America is one of relatively¶ benign expansion, confined to seeking out trade and investment opportunities.17 They say¶ that the inroads China has made into the region are marginal compared with longstanding U.S. economic linkages, and they see evidence that Chinese officials have been restrained¶ in their Latin American contacts.18 They point out that U.S. trade and investment in Latin¶ America dwarfs that of China’s involvement in the region. (U.S. imports from Latin¶ America amounted to $255 billion in 2004, while U.S. cumulative direct investment in¶ Latin America in 2003 amounted to some $304 billion.19) Morever, observers contend¶ that the future growth potential of Chinese investment and trade will always be¶ constrained by the economic advantages conferred by U.S. geographic proximity to Latin¶ America. Furthermore, they indicate that migration patterns to the United States from¶ Central and South American countries have given the United States greater cultural ties¶ and longer-term economic importance to the region than China could ever have.¶ Adherents of this view maintain that the United States should avoid overreacting to¶ China’s economic initiatives in Latin America. They assert that China’s emerging¶ presence in the region is not a threat to the United Sates, but is consistent with the longstanding U.S. policy of integrating China into the world system.20

## 2ac say yes v2

**Maduro is working with investment capital both from the US and Venezuela now**

**Van Auken 6/7**-- politician and activist for the Socialist Equality Party (Bill, “Venezuela’s Maduro reaches out to big business and Washington”, 2013, <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/07/vene-j07.html>) EL

After three months in office, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, the handpicked successor of the late Hugo Chavez, has put aside left rhetoric to seek accommodation with Venezuela’s biggest capitalists as well as with the Obama administration in Washington. Maduro has repeatedly charged in recent months that US imperialism was conspiring to bring down his government and was the guiding hand behind a wave of political violence that followed his narrow election victory against right-wing candidate Henrique Capriles in April. Yet Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Elias Jaua was all smiles Wednesday, following a 40-minute meeting in Guatemala with US Secretary of State John Kerry. The two, who met privately on the sidelines of the Organization of American States General Assembly meeting in Antigua, Guatemala, declared their commitment to, in Kerry’s words, “establish a more constructive and positive relationship.” This is to include resuming the exchange of ambassadors, which has been suspended since late 2010. It was Venezuela that requested the meeting. “We agreed today there will be an ongoing, continuing dialogue between the State Department and the Foreign Ministry, and we will try to set out an agenda by which we agree on things we can work together,” said Kerry. For his part, Jaua declared that “A good relationship between the government of President Nicolas Maduro and the government of President Barack Obama is what suits both peoples, it’s the guarantee of peace and stability for our peoples.” Just last month, Maduro referred to Obama in a public speech as “the big boss of the devils” and accused him of backing the “fascist right” in attacking the Venezuelan people. In Guatemala, Jaua said that he had presented Kerry with a report on the violence that followed the April 14 election to choose Chavez’s successor in which 11 people were killed and 80 injured, most of them Maduro supporters. He gave the US secretary of state an extract of the report prepared on the incidents by Venezuela’s Public Advocate’s office. He said that the discussion had “alerted Kerry to the actions of anti-democratic groups in Venezuela, which threaten Venezuelan democracy, stability and which often are being supported by political and economic sectors of other countries.” In point of fact, the most significant “sectors” seeking to destabilize the Venezuelan regime have long been the CIA and the US State Department. Maduro’s turn toward accommodation with US imperialism has been accompanied by a similar approach to both foreign and domestic capital. Among the most significant deals in terms of foreign capital was reached late last month with Chevron Corp. Chevron is providing $2 billion in financing for Petroboscan, a joint venture between the US oil giant and Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA, to boost heavy crude production in the northwestern state of Zulia. Shortly beforehand, PDVSA secured a $1 billion credit line with Houston-based Schlumberger Ltd., the world’s largest oilfield services company. While oil exports to the US have declined to about 900,000 barrels a day, it remains Venezuela’s chief customer for oil, responsible for 95 percent of the country’s export earnings and roughly half of its federal budget revenue. From the standpoint of the US-based energy conglomerates, securing dominance over Venezuela’s oil reserves, the largest in the world, remains a strategic objective. The investments by Chevron and Schlumberger make clear that they see the potential for major profits, the Venezuelan government’s rhetoric about “Bolivarian socialism” notwithstanding. Domestically, after charging for months that major Venezuelan capitalists, backed by the US, were waging an “economic war” against his government, Maduro invited the country’s second-richest individual, Lorenzo Mendoza, the head of the country’s largest food company, Polar, to meet with him last month at the Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas. Both Chavez and Maduro had singled out Polar and Mendoza for attack over the country’s increasingly severe shortages and rising food prices. Holding them responsible for hoarding and waging an “economic war,” they threatened to nationalize the firm. For his part, Mendoza, who is worth some $4.5 billion, was an enthusiastic supporter of the US-backed coup that briefly unseated Chavez in April 2002. This history had contributed to his keeping a fairly low profile under Chavez, but it was noted in the Venezuelan media that he mounted a vigorous public defense of his company in the face of Maduro’s recent charges. Mendoza described the meeting as “very cordial, direct, sincere,” adding, “The president was very kind in listening to us and communicating the need to keep investing, producing and supplying markets. That is our lifelong commitment, passion and vocation.” He said that the two had reached an agreement “not to politicize” the issue of food. Vice President Jorge Arreaza provided a similar description of the encounter between the “working class” president and the billionaire. “The problem’s been overcome,” he said. The meeting with Mendoza was only the most visible of a series of talks between the government and prominent Venezuelan capitalists. Among the deals reached is the lifting of certain price controls and the easing of currency restrictions. “In another sign of the rapprochement, the hallways of the finance ministry for the first time in years are filled with businessmen in sharp suits,” Reuters reported. “Many carry folders stuffed with requests for greater flexibility in the currency control system and an easing of price controls.” The news agency quoted Finance Minister Nelson Merentes stating after one meeting with business executives: “We’ve entered a phase of creating closer ties with the private sector, without ignoring the new socialist economy.” After months of charging the big bourgeoisie in Venezuela with “sabotage,” the Maduro government is now currying its favor and begging it to increase production. This turn is driven by a deepening economic crisis characterized by a decline in growth, soaring inflation and widespread shortages. Venezuela’s inflation rate is now near 30 percent, with the bulk of it reflecting the sharp rise in the price of food. Meanwhile, the growth rate for the first quarter of 2013 amounted to just 0.7 percent. This overall figure, however, masks the severity of the situation. Venezuela’s financial sector, which continues to enjoy some of the highest profit rates in the world, saw a 31 percent growth during this period, while manufacturing declined by 3.6 percent and construction by 1.2 percent. The scarcity index, which tracks the amount of products missing from store shelves, has hit its highest level since the Central Bank began tracking these figures. The accommodation between the Maduro government and Venezuelan capitalists, on the one hand, and Washington, on the other, has taken the political wind out of the sails of the rightist candidate Henrique Capriles, who has continued to charge electoral fraud and condemn Maduro as an illegitimate president. While the Obama administration has yet to formally recognize Maduro’s close election victory, it has turned a cold shoulder to demands for OAS sanctions against Venezuela. And Mendoza’s visit to Miraflores indicates that the billionaire accepts Maduro as legitimate. Clearly, both domestic and foreign capital recognize that behind the left rhetoric and the limited social reforms of “Bolivarian Socialism,” Maduro’s government defends capitalism and they can do business with it. More fundamentally, continued agitation by the right wing and a further weakening of the government under conditions of deepening economic crisis and rising popular discontent poses the danger of provoking a social explosion in the working class.

## ptx- rr

**Won’t pass – base opposition and no moderates**

**Gandelman, 9/18/13** – (Joe, “Republicans all in: government shutdown by Repubicans virtually certain” <http://themoderatevoice.com/186749/republicans-all-in-government-shutdown-by-repubicans-virtually-certain/>)

It’s going to happen. You can bet on it. **Republicans now seem all in** – despite some pesky noises from they-must-be-RINO websites such as the Wall Street Journal and the National Review about the dangers — to set the stage for a government shut down. And don’t be surprised if it then gets worse and House Republicans **engineer a default** on the debt ceiling as well:

House Republicans are moving forward with a government funding bill that would defund ObamaCare.

The legislation is a nod to House conservatives, some of whom quickly backed the plan.

But Senate Democrats and the White House have promised to reject any legislation that would defund the healthcare law, meaning the legislation won’t move farther than the House.

Unless the House and Senate can agree on legislation and get it to the White House by Oct. 1, the government will shut down at that time.

Basically, the GOP House leadership is politically twerking its powerful Tea Party sympathetic members. But the consquences to many Americans that even a brief shutdown would bring could be huge.

And who says this will necessarily be a brief shutdown?

The House measure would keep the government funded through Dec. 15 at the current $986 billion spending rate, rather than the lower $967 billion level called for in the 2011 Budget Control Act.

GOP leaders also announced Wednesday that they will condition a debt ceiling increase on a one-year delay of ObamaCare, approval of the Keystone XL pipeline and an outline for tax reform.

In other words:

Republicans are going to use political extortion — hurting the United States’s economy — if they can’t get policies that they are unable to get by winning elections or putting together coalitions in Congress. It’s a tough choice for Barack Obama and the Democrats: if this is allowed to happen it will fundamentally change the form of American democracy.

Republican Study Committee Chairman Steve Scalise (R-La.) said he was on board with the plan despite the higher spending level.

“This reflects the principles we’ve been pushing for,” he said. “We want to address ObamaCare directly in the CR. We want to address ObamaCare in the debt ceiling and this keeps both of those moving.”

Yes — in a way unprecedented in American democracy. And:

Rep. Tom Graves (R-Ga.), who authored a one-year CR that would increase defense spending while defunding ObamaCare, said he would vote for the new Boehner plan.

“It’s a step in the right direction,” Graves said. “The American people should view this as a victory.”

I agree with Booman: there is a notable lack of adults in the Republican room, and a notably large number of conservative talk show host followers and Tea Party members. Booman:

It’s a two-pronged approach. On the continuing resolution (CR) to fund the government, the Republicans will limit the funding to December 15th. The funding level will be slightly above what the Budget Control Act of 2011 calls for. And it will defund ObamaCare.

On the debt ceiling, they will have a separate vote that will delay ObamaCare for a year, authorize the Keystone XL pipeline, and provide an outline for tax reform.

Their hope is that they can successfully pass the buck to Republican senators who will be expected to sustain a filibuster against any CR or debt ceiling hike that includes money for health care.

It really doesn’t matter whether the Senate Republicans go along with the plan or not, because the government will shut down either way and **we will default on our debts either way.**

The pressure on Republican senators will be intense, but they’d rather let the House take the blame for the catastrophe.

The fact that the Senate Minority Leader, Mitch McConnell, is facing a primary challenge from his right makes it unlikely that he will ride to the House’s rescue this time around. If we’re hoping for adult leadership in the Senate, it will have to come from a rump of moderate Republican senators that doesn’t seem to exist.

**Engagement with Venezuela popular in Congress – Chavez’s death changed the equation—their ev is from 2010 and too old**

**Spetalnick ‘13**

Matt Spetalnick – White House correspondent who has covered news on four continents for Reuters, from Latin American coups and drug wars – Reuter’s – March 6th, 2013 – “Despite new hopes, U.S. treads cautiously after death of Venezuela's Chavez” – http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/uk-venezuela-chavez-usa-idUKBRE92504920130306

Washington's challenge will be to figure out how far to go in seizing the opening to engage with Venezuelan leaders as well as its political opposition without giving the impression of U.S. meddling following the socialist president's death after a two-year battle with cancer. "We're not interested in having a confrontational relationship with Venezuela," a senior U.S. official told Reuters. "We're going to have to see how things evolve. It's a dynamic period." For Washington, a major test will be whether Venezuela follows its own constitution - which has been widely interpreted to require a special election to pick Chavez's successor - and if such a vote is conducted in a free and fair way in "accordance with hemispheric norms," the official said. Washington had accused Chavez and his allies of electoral abuses, such as intimidating foes and misusing state media during his 14-year rule. Chavez had created headaches for successive U.S. administrations with his strong anti-American rhetoric and his alliances with some of Washington's main foes, including Cuba and Iran. The question now is whether his leftist "revolution" and incendiary foreign policy can live on without his dominant personality at the helm. In a normally divided Washington, Chavez's death brought a rare moment of bipartisan agreement, with Republicans and Democrats alike seeing it as a chance to turn a page after a long period of strained U.S.-Venezuelan ties.

**Plan’s popular—Rwanda BIT proves**

**Broadbent and Pancake 12**—Meredith Broadbent is a senior adviser at CSIS, where she holds the William M. Scholl Chair in International Business and Robbins Pancake a senior associate for the William M. Scholl Chair in International Business (“Reinvigorating the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program”, June, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120629_Broadbent_ReinvigoratingBIT_Web.pdf>) EL

What are the key constituencies?¶ Two constituencies in Washington tend to oppose BITs—significant portions of the development¶ community and some Democratic members of Congress close to labor and environmental interest¶ groups. The concerns of both constituencies need to be addressed in order for a robust BIT¶ program to go forward.¶ Traditionally, the development community has taken the view that economic development is¶ best promoted by foreign aid that, if targeted correctly, should be sustainable and eventually spur¶ local private-sector growth. Included in that view may also be skepticism about whether private¶ multinational business investors will actually integrate into the local economy and help develop¶ the institutional infrastructure and good governance necessary for long-term growth and employment.¶ The truth may be somewhere in the middle, but additional outreach to the development¶ community, advocacy organizations, and the African Development Bank would be useful.¶ A message in support of BITs needs to be crafted to confirm that in the twenty-first century¶ global economy, private-sector trade and investment are economic development tools that create¶ jobs and commerce in developing countries, thereby improving living standards.36 In addition, it is¶ important to demonstrate that BITs and other regional and multilateral agreements are vehicles for¶ increasing transparency and rule of law, not part of a hidden agenda of multinational companies¶ to exploit the developing world. For instance, the huge increase (cited above) in FDI as a percentage¶ of total investment, compared to foreign aid, demonstrates that dramatic changes have taken¶ place over the last 50 years. Further, of the 2,600 BITs concluded in the last 50 years, more than¶ 1,200 are South-South BITs between developing countries, which tend to disprove the allegation¶ of a North-South plot by the United States and multinational companies. In addition, the World¶ Bank and in particular its outgoing president Robert Zoellick are strong advocates of trade and¶ investment as development tools preferable to aid.¶ Congress, for its part, plays a direct role in developing and implementing national policy on¶ investment because the Senate, led by the Foreign Relations Committee, has the constitutional¶ responsibility to ratify treaties, including BITs. In addition, since foreign trade agreements—which¶ include chapters on investment—are subject to approvals by both houses, all members are involved¶ to some extent.¶ Therefore, part of a BIT program should include framing a message to Congress in support of¶ BITs and addressing the issues of interest to members. For instance, the studies referenced above,¶ which show that establishing BITs is a job creator in the United States, would be very useful. Likewise,¶ characterizing a reenergized U.S. BIT program as a counterweight to Chinese commercial¶ outreach to the developing world would appeal to many members.37 Certain members of Congress,¶ including Democrats like Congressmen Greg Meeks (D-NY) and Joe Crowley (D-NY) and¶ Senators Mark Warner (D-VA) and possibly Robert Menendez (D-NJ), could serve as champions¶ for the FDI and BITs with their colleagues. Indeed, given the arcane nature of BITs, finding a few¶ willing advocates to champion the merits of BITs is probably the way to proceed.¶ Ultimately, despite all the concerns and criticisms, on September 28, 2011, the Senate did¶ ratify the pending U.S.-Rwanda BIT by unanimous voice vote. So, the partisanship in the current¶ Congress apparently did not prove insurmountable in passing a BIT, as some had previously¶ thought.

**Winners win—Bush proves**

**Fortier 9** [John, Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, January 14th, *Spend Your Political Capital Before It's Gone*, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0109/17395.html]

Bush came into the presidency after a protracted election dispute but acted like a man with a mandate. His election victory, no matter how small, was a form of political capital to be spent, and he pushed his tax and education reform packages through Congress. After the Sept. 11 attacks, Republican victories in the 2002 midterm election and the initial phase of the Iraq war, Bush gained more political capital. And each time, he spent it, going to Congress for more tax cuts, the creation of a Department of Homeland Security and other domestic priorities. Bush developed the image of a winner. Despite narrow Republican majorities in Congress, he succeeded in holding his party together and pulling out one legislative victory after another. He famously did not veto a bill in his first term. Even when Bush veered from a typical conservative agenda on education reform and Medicare prescription drugs, Republicans voted with him, although some held their noses. Republicans in Congress did not want to break the string of Bush’s first-term legislative juggernaut. Bush was spending his political capital and, by winning, was getting repaid. Bush’s 2004 reelection was the apex of his presidency. He won a spirited, high- turnout contest by a clear margin, he brought more Republicans to Congress, and he was ready to spend his latest cache of political capital on two big domestic priorities: Social Security reform and tax reform. But 2005 saw Bush lose all of his political capital. His domestic priorities were bold, but he had overreached and did not have plans that Congress could get to work on immediately. The legislative vacuum in Congress stood in contrast to Bush’s first term, where Congress was almost always busy at work on Bush priorities. More importantly, conditions in Iraq deteriorated, and the public began to lose confidence in the president and his ability to win the war. Bush himself said that he had spent his political capital in Iraq and had lost it there. Republican scandals and the president’s lack of leadership immediately after Hurricane Katrina further damaged Bush. The winning streak was over, the president’s job approval numbers had dropped and his days setting the legislative agenda were over. Even though Bush had his biggest Republican majorities in the 109th Congress, Republican leaders staked out their own agenda, not wanting to tie themselves to a now unpopular president. Bush never regained political capital after 2005. Ronald Reagan had early heady days when he controlled the agenda; his popularity waned, but he was able to regain his footing. Bill Clinton famously bounced from highs to lows and back again. But for Bush, there was no second act. Reagan and Clinton could counterpunch and thrive as president without control of Congress. The Bush presidency had only two settings: on and off. In his first term, Bush controlled the legislative agenda like a prime minister; in the second, others set the agenda. President-elect Barack Obama won election more convincingly than Bush, and he will have larger congressional majorities than Republicans had. No doubt he will begin with some political capital of his own. But as the Bush presidency has taught us, that capital will run out someday, and a real test of leadership will be how Obama adjusts.

## at: adv cp

**Geo-Engineering fails**

**Moriarty and Honnery ’10 – Both PhDs**

Patrick Moriarty, Ph.D. Department of Design, Monash University, and Damon Honnery, Ph.D. Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Monash University. “Why Technical Fixes Won’t Mitigate Climate Change”. Journal of Cosmology, 2010, Vol 8, 1921-1927. http://journalofcosmology.com/ClimateChange107.html

As discussed here, geoengineering is action intended to manipulate climate on a global, or at least regional, scale. Corner and Pidgeon (2010) have pointed out that our emissions of CO2 (which have raised atmospheric CO2 levels from the pre-industrial 280 ppm to the present 387 ppm) could also be considered geoengineering. If so, we are merely arguing about different forms of the practice. The potential use of geoengineering for climate mitigation received a boost with a paper by Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen (2006). Like the present authors, he argued that conventional methods of mitigation were not working—the CO2 atmospheric concentration continues to climb at about 2 ppm each year. His inspiration was the significant drop in global temperatures recorded in the year following the Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption in the Philippines in June 1991. The cooling resulted from the emission of some 10 Mt of sulphate aerosols into the lower stratosphere in the tropics. Continuous deliberate placement of fine sulphate aerosols in the lower stratosphere would reflect some of the incoming short-wave solar radiation, increasing the Earth’s albedo, and counteracting the positive forcing from increased levels of GHGs. The options available for geoengineering can be either local in extent (such as altering the albedo of deserts, crops or urban areas) or global (such as the use of giant space-based mirrors). Only aerosol placement in the tropical stratosphere, albedo enhancement of marine stratiform clouds and reflective mirrors in space would have the potential to counteract a doubling or more of atmospheric CO2 ppm (Lenton and Vaughan 2009). Of these global approaches, the cheapest is likely to be aerosol placement. Except for space-based mirrors, the approaches appear both far cheaper and far faster to implement than more conventional mitigation methods. Because of the lack of progress in slowing emissions and the low cost and rapid cooling resulting from global measures, geoengineering is gaining acceptance. The U.K. Royal Society (2009) has endorsed it as a technique to be used alongside other mitigation methods. But implementing measures to reduce the planetary albedo run enormous risks. Global precipitation would on average be reduced—it is not possible to bring both global temperatures and precipitation to their previous levels (Bala 2009). Acidification of the oceans would continue, potentially destabilising ocean ecosystems (Doney et al. 2009). Also, because elevated levels of CO2 will persist for centuries, so too must geoengineering—the continuous placement of aerosols, for example. Any abrupt cessation because of dangerous side effects discovered would rapidly raise the forcing to levels corresponding to the GHG concentrations at that time, resulting in very rapid warming, with possibly catastrophic effects on ecosystems (Matthews and Caldeira 2007). Thus although the costs of aerosol placement may well be modest, the overall cost of countering the unwanted consequences could be very high. Recently, perhaps because of these serious drawbacks, some researchers have modelled the effects of more modest aerosol placement schemes. Rather than global year-round aerosol coverage, they have looked at techniques that might prevent melting of the Greenhouse ice cap or Arctic summer sea ice, or summer warming of the north Atlantic during the hurricane season (Caldeira and Wood 2008, MacCracken 2009). The aerosols might be locally applied, for part of the year, to address a very specific problem resulting from climate change. But to be effective, their effects would necessarily be felt globally (Caldeira and Wood 2008), and if several of these projects were to be implemented simultaneously, the combined gobal effects might be extremely uncertain.

## framework

**Cap isn’t the root cause of anything**

**Aberdeen, 03** (Richard, “THE WAY: A Theory of Root Cause and Solution”, http://richardaberdeen.com/essays/Etheway.html)

A view shared by many modern activists is that capitalism, free enterprise, multi-national corporations and globalization are the primary cause of the current global Human Rights problem and that by striving to change or eliminate these, the root problem of what ills the modern world is being addressed.  This is a rather unfortunate and historically myopic view, reminiscent of early “class struggle” Marxists who soon resorted to violence as a means to achieve rather questionable ends.  And like these often brutal early Marxists, modern anarchists who resort to violence to solve the problem are walking upside down and backwards, adding to rather than correcting, both the immediate and long-term Human Rights problem.  Violent revolution, including our own American revolution, becomes a breeding ground for poverty, disease, starvation and often mass oppression leading to future violence.

Large, publicly traded corporations are created by individuals or groups of individuals, operated by individuals and made up of individual and/or group investors.  These business enterprises are deliberately structured to be empowered by individual (or group) investor greed.  For example, a theorized ‘need’ for offering salaries much higher than is necessary to secure competent leadership (often resulting in corrupt and entirely incompetent leadership), lowering wages more than is fair and equitable and scaling back of often hard fought for benefits, is sold to stockholders as being in the best interest of the bottom-line market value and thus, in the best economic interests of individual investors.  Likewise, major political and corporate exploitation of third-world nations is rooted in the individual and joint greed of corporate investors and others who stand to profit from such exploitation.  More than just investor greed, corporations are driven by the greed of all those involved, including individuals outside the enterprise itself who profit indirectly from it.

If one examines “the course of human events” closely, it can correctly be surmised that the “root” cause of humanity’s problems comes from individual human greed and similar negative individual motivation.  The Marx/Engles view of history being a “class” struggle ¹  does not address the root problem and is thus fundamentally flawed from a true historical perspective (see Gallo Brothers for more details).  So-called “classes” of people, unions, corporations and political groups are made up of individuals who support the particular group or organizational position based on their own individual needs, greed and desires and thus, an apparent “class struggle” in reality, is an extension of individual motivation.  Likewise, nations engage in wars of aggression, not because capitalism or classes of society are at root cause, but because individual members of a society are individually convinced that it is in their own economic survival best interest.  War, poverty, starvation and lack of Human and Civil Rights have existed on our planet since long before the rise of modern capitalism, free enterprise and multi-national corporation avarice, thus the root problem obviously goes deeper than this.

Junior Bush and the neo-conservative genocidal maniacs of modern-day America could not have recently effectively gone to war against Iraq without the individual support of individual troops and a certain percentage of individual citizens within the U.S. population, each lending support for their own personal motives, whatever they individually may have been.  While it is true that corrupt leaders often provoke war, using all manner of religious, social and political means to justify, often as not, entirely ludicrous ends, very rare indeed is a battle only engaged in by these same unscrupulous miscreants of power.  And though a few iniquitous elitist powerbrokers may initiate nefarious policies of global genocidal oppression, it takes a very great many individuals operating from individual personal motivations of survival, desire and greed to develop these policies into a multi-national exploitive reality.

No economic or political organization and no political or social cause exists unto itself but rather, individual members power a collective agenda.  A workers’ strike has no hope of succeeding if individual workers do not perceive a personal benefit.  And similarly, a corporation will not exploit workers if doing so is not believed to be in the economic best interest of those who run the corporation and who in turn, must answer (at least theoretically) to individuals who collectively through purchase or other allotment of shares, own the corporation.  Companies have often been known to appear benevolent, offering both higher wages and improved benefits, if doing so is perceived to be in the overall economic best interest of the immediate company and/or larger corporate entity.  Non-unionized business enterprises frequently offer ‘carrots’ of appeasement to workers in order to discourage them from organizing and historically in the United States, concessions such as the forty-hour workweek, minimum wage, workers compensation and proscribed holidays have been grudgingly capitulated to by greedy capitalist masters as necessary concessions to avoid profit-crippling strikes and outright revolution.

## Baudrillard

**We do, in fact, know the difference between simulation and reality—the media plays a healthy role in the public sphere.**

**March, 95** James Marsh, Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University, 95, Critique, Action, and Liberation, pp. 292-293

Such an account, however, is as one-sided or perhaps even more one-sided than that of naive modernism. We note a residual idealism that does not take into account socioeconomic realities already pointed out such as the corporate nature of media, their role in achieving and legitimating profit, and their function of manufacturing consent. In such a postmodernist account is a reduction of everything to image or symbol that misses the relationship of these to realities such as corporations seeking profit, impoverished workers in these corporations, or peasants in Third-World countries trying to conduct elections. Postmodernism does not adequately distinguish here between a reduction of reality to image and a mediation of reality by image. A media idealism exists rooted in the influence of structuralism and poststructuralism and doing insufficient justice to concrete human experience, judgment, and free interaction in the world.4 It is also paradoxical or contradictory to say it really is true that nothing is really true, that everything is illusory or imaginary. Postmodemism makes judgments that implicitly deny the reduction of reality to image. For example, Poster and Baudrillard do want to say that we really are in a new age that is informational and postindustrial. Again, to say that everything is imploded into media images is akin logically to the Cartesian claim that everything is or might be a dream. What happens is that dream or image is absolutized or generalized to the point that its original meaning lying in its contrast to natural, human, and social reality is lost. We can discuss Disneyland as reprehensible because we know the difference between Disneyland and the larger, enveloping reality of Southern California and the United States.5 We can note also that postmodernism misses the reality of the accumulation-legitimation tension in late capitalism in general and in communicative media in particular. This tension takes different forms in different times. In the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, social, economic, and political reality occasionally manifested itself in the media in such a way that the electorate responded critically to corporate and political policies. Coverage of the Vietnam war, for example, did help turn people against the war. In the 1980s, by contrast, the emphasis shifted more toward accumulation in the decade dominated by the “great communicator.” Even here, however, the majority remained opposed to Reagan’s policies while voting for Reagan. Human and social reality, while being influenced by and represented by the media, transcended them and remained resistant to them.6 To the extent that postmodernists are critical of the role media play, we can ask the question about the normative adequacy of such a critique. Why, in the absence of normative conceptions of rationality and freedom, should media dominance be taken as bad rather than good? Also, the most relevant contrasting, normatively structured alternative to the media is that of the “public sphere,” in which the imperatives of free, democratic, nonmanipulable communicative action are institutionalized. Such a public sphere has been present in western democracies since the nineteenth century but has suffered erosion in the twentieth century as capitalism has more and more taken over the media and commercialized them. Even now the public sphere remains normatively binding and really operative through institutionalizing the ideals of free, full, public expression and discussion; ideal, legal requirements taking such forms as public service programs, public broadcasting, and provision for alternative media; and social movements acting and discoursing in and outside of universities in print, in demonstrations and forms of resistance, and on media such as movies, television, and radio.7

**The critique refuses to accept the same falsifiable review our evidence goes through – disproves their methodology, destroys academic debate, and causes extinction.**

**Coyne, 06** – Author and Writer for the Times (Jerry A., “A plea for empiricism”, FOLLIES OF THE WISE, Dissenting essays, 405pp. Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker and Hoard, 1 59376 101 5)

Supernatural forces and events, essential aspects of most religions, play no role in science, not because we exclude them deliberately, but because they have never been a useful way to understand nature. Scientific “truths” are empirically supported observations agreed on by different observers. Religious “truths,” on the other hand, are personal, unverifiable and contested by those of different faiths. Science is nonsectarian: those who disagree on scientific issues do not blow each other up. Science encourages doubt; most religions quash it. But religion is not completely separable from science. Virtually all religions make improbable claims that are in principle empirically testable, and thus within the domain of science: Mary, in Catholic teaching, was bodily taken to heaven, while Muhammad rode up on a white horse; and Jesus (born of a virgin) came back from the dead. None of these claims has been corroborated, and while science would never accept them as true without evidence, religion does. A mind that accepts both science and religion is thus a mind in conflict. Yet scientists, especially beleaguered American evolutionists, need the support of the many faithful who respect science. It is not politically or tactically useful to point out the fundamental and unbreachable gaps between science and theology. Indeed, scientists and philosophers have written many books (equivalents of Leibnizian theodicy) desperately trying to show how these areas can happily cohabit. In his essay, “Darwin goes to Sunday School”, Crews reviews several of these works, pointing out with brio the intellectual contortions and dishonesties involved in harmonizing religion and science. Assessing work by the evolutionist Stephen Jay Gould, the philosopher Michael Ruse, the theologian John Haught and others, Crews concludes, “When coldly examined . . . these productions invariably prove to have adulterated scientific doctrine or to have emptied religious dogma of its commonly accepted meaning”. Rather than suggesting any solution (indeed, there is none save adopting a form of “religion” that makes no untenable empirical claims), Crews points out the dangers to the survival of our planet arising from a rejection of Darwinism. Such rejection promotes apathy towards overpopulation, pollution, deforestation and other environmental crimes: “So long as we regard ourselves as creatures apart who need only repent of our personal sins to retain heaven’s blessing, we won’t take the full measure of our species-wise responsibility for these calamities”. Crews includes three final essays on deconstruction and other misguided movements in literary theory. These also show “follies of the wise” in that they involve interpretations of texts that are unanchored by evidence. Fortunately, the harm inflicted by Lacan and his epigones is limited to the good judgement of professors of literature. Follies of the Wise is one of the most refreshing and edifying collections of essays in recent years. Much like Christopher Hitchens in the UK, Crews serves a vital function as National Sceptic. He ends on a ringing note: “The human race has produced only one successfully validated epistemology, characterizing all scrupulous inquiry into the real world, from quarks to poems. It is, simply, empiricism, or the submitting of propositions to the arbitration of evidence that is acknowledged to be such by all of the contending parties. Ideas that claim immunity from such review, whether because of mystical faith or privileged “clinical insight” or the say-so of eminent authorities, are not to be countenanced until they can pass the same skeptical ordeal to which all other contenders are subjected.” As science in America becomes ever more harried and debased by politics and religion, we desperately need to heed Crews’s plea for empiricism.

**You should reject their Baudrillard evidence—it’s hackery cloaked in deliberately obscure language.**

**Dawkins 2007** – Simonyi Professor for the Public Understanding of Science in the University of Oxford, fellow at the Royal Society of Literature, he has an asteroid officially named after him (4/1, Richard, Nature 394 pp. 141-3, review of Intellectual Impostures by Sokal and Bricmont, “Postmodernism Disrobed”, http://richarddawkins.net/article,824,Postmodernism-Disrobed,Richard-Dawkins-Nature, WEA)

But it's tough on the reader. No doubt there exist thoughts so profound that most of us will not understand the language in which they are expressed. And no doubt there is also language designed to be unintelligible in order to conceal an absence of honest thought. But how are we to tell the difference? What if it really takes an expert eye to detect whether the emperor has clothes? In particular, how shall we know whether the modish French 'philosophy', whose disciples and exponents have all but taken over large sections of American academic life, is genuinely profound or the vacuous rhetoric of mountebanks and charlatans?

Sokal and Bricmont are professors of physics at, respectively New York University and the University of Louvain. They have limited their critique to those books that have ventured to invoke concepts from physics and mathematics. Here they know what they are talking about, and their verdict is unequivocal: on Lacan, for example, whose name is revered by many in humanities departments throughout American and British universities, no doubt partly because he simulates a profound understanding of mathematics:

 . . . although Lacan uses quite a few key words from the mathematical theory of compactness, he mixes them up arbitrarily and without the slightest regard for their meaning. His 'definition' of compactness is not just false: it is gibberish.

They go on to quote the following remarkable piece of reasoning by Lacan:

Thus, by calculating that signification according to the algebraic method used here, namely:

 S (signifier) = s (the statement),

 s (signified)

 With S = (-1), produces: s = sqrt(-1)

You don't have to be a mathematician to see that this is ridiculous. It recalls the Aldous Huxley character who proved the existence of God by dividing zero into a number, thereby deriving the infinite. In a further piece of reasoning which is entirely typical of the genre, Lacan goes on to conclude that the erectile organ

 . . . is equivalent to the sqrt(-1) of the signification produced above, of the jouissance that it restores by the coefficient of its statement to the function of lack of signifier (-1).

We do not need the mathematical expertise of Sokal and Bricmont to assure us that the author of this stuff is a fake. Perhaps he is genuine when he speaks of non-scientific subjects? But a philosopher who is caught equating the erectile organ to the square root of minus one has, for my money, blown his credentials when it comes to things that I don't know anything about.

The feminist 'philosopher' Luce Irigaray is another who is given whole chapter treatment by Sokal and Bricmont. In a passage reminiscent of a notorious feminist description of Newton's Principia (a 'rape manual') Irigaray argues that E=mc2 is a 'sexed equation'. Why? Because 'it privileges the speed of light over other speeds that are vitally necessary to us' (my emphasis of what I am rapidly coming to learn is an in-word). Just as typical of the school of thought under examination is Irigaray's thesis on fluid mechanics. Fluids, you see, have been unfairly neglected. 'Masculine physics' privileges rigid, solid things. Her American expositor Katherine Hayles made the mistake of re-expressing Irigaray's thoughts in (comparatively) clear language. For once, we get a reasonably unobstructed look at the emperor and, yes, he has no clothes:

 The privileging of solid over fluid mechanics, and indeed the inability of science to deal with turbulent flow at all, she attributes to the association of fluidity with femininity. Whereas men have sex organs that protrude and become rigid, women have openings that leak menstrual blood and vaginal fluids. . . From this perspective it is no wonder that science has not been able to arrive at a successful model for turbulence. The problem of turbulent flow cannot be solved because the conceptions of fluids (and of women) have been formulated so as necessarily to leave unarticulated remainders.

You don't have to be a physicist to smell out the daffy absurdity of this kind of argument (the tone of it has become all too familiar), but it helps to have Sokal and Bricmont on hand to tell us the real reason why turbulent flow is a hard problem (the Navier-Stokes equations are difficult to solve).

In similar manner, Sokal and Bricmont expose Bruno Latour's confusion of relativity with relativism, Lyotard's 'postmodern science', and the widespread and predictable misuses of G�del's Theorem, quantum theory and chaos theory. The renowned Jean Baudrillard is only one of many to find chaos theory a useful tool for bamboozling readers. Once again, Sokal and Bricmont help us by analysing the tricks being played. The following sentence, "though constructed from scientific terminology, is meaningless from a scientific point of view":

 Perhaps history itself has to be regarded as a chaotic formation, in which acceleration puts an end to linearity and the turbulence created by acceleration deflects history definitively from its end, just as such turbulence distances effects from their causes.

I won't quote any more, for, as Sokal and Bricmont say, Baudrillard's text "continues in a gradual crescendo of nonsense." They again call attention to "the high density of scientific and pseudo-scientific terminology — inserted in sentences that are, as far as we can make out, devoid of meaning." Their summing up of Baudrillard could stand for any of the authors criticised here, and lionised throughout America:

 In summary, one finds in Baudrillard's works a profusion of scientific terms, used with total disregard for their meaning and, above all, in a context where they are manifestly irrelevant. Whether or not one interprets them as metaphors, it is hard to see what role they could play, except to give an appearance of profundity to trite observations about sociology or history. Moreover, the scientific terminology is mixed up with a non-scientific vocabulary that is employed with equal sloppiness. When all is said and done, one wonders what would be left of Baudrillard's thought if the verbal veneer covering it were stripped away.

**Threats are real and our disaster discourse mobilizes people to deal with them**

**Kurasawa 4**

(Fuyuki Kurasawa, Associate Professor of Sociology at York University in Toronto, Canada, 2004, Constellations Vol 11, No 4, 2004, Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight <http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf>)

In addition, farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats and the resurgence of ‘older’ ones. Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalism and religious fundamentalism that had mostly been kept in check or bottled up during the Cold War have reasserted themselves in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and global terrorism. And if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective remembrance of past atrocities and disasters has galvanized some sectors of public opinion and made the international community’s unwillingness to adequately intervene before and during the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring. Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary (or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopian novels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood’s Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts.13 Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

**Death precedes all other impacts – it ontologically destroys the subject and prevents any alternative way of knowing the world**

**Paterson, 03** - Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81

In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life

itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

**aff vs mcdonough**

## 2ac say yes v2

**recency-- pressure to increase investment is high now—power outages and economic problems**

**BBC 9/6**—“Venezuela’s economic woes: Sabotage or mismanagement?”, Irene Caselli, <http://www.americas-forum.com/venezuelas-economic-woes-sabotage-or-mismanagement/>) EL

Theories abound in Venezuela regarding Tuesday’s blackout which affected more than two-thirds of the country. While President Nicolas Maduro has accused political opponents of sabotaging the power system, the opposition blames government incompetence for the largest power cut in five years. As parts of the country are still facing problems with the electricity and the political finger-pointing continues, many are asking just how vulnerable Venezuela’s infrastructure is. The capital, Caracas, is not used to the power cuts which have become quite common in other regions. On Tuesday, cash machines, traffic lights and the underground stopped working. There was traffic chaos, with some people stuck in train carriages. ‘Lack of investment’ Thousands of workers poured into the streets, with many finding it hard to make their way down from upper floors when emergency lamps turned out to be faulty. Jose Manuel Puente, an economist at the IESA School of Management, says the power cut is a sign of a wider malaise. “Unfortunately what happened on Tuesday is similar to what’s happening to the country’s entire infrastructure. Investment in certain areas has been reduced to minimum under [Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian] revolution,” he explained. “What we see now is an inexorable consequence of over a decade of unbalanced economic policies.” Most supporters of the late president and his successor Nicolas Maduro would not agree with Mr Puente’s analysis. But even Finance Minister Nelson Merentes recently acknowledged that the economic policies followed by the government had not been successful. In a television interview broadcast on the weekend, he called for reforms to tackle structural economic problems. “This is a government that has won 18 elections, that has had social achievements,” he told TV channel Televen. “But it still has to be successful on the economy.”

**Maduro’s current policy proves**

**Van Auken 6/7**-- politician and activist for the Socialist Equality Party (Bill, “Venezuela’s Maduro reaches out to big business and Washington”, 2013, <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/07/vene-j07.html>) EL

After three months in office, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, the handpicked successor of the late Hugo Chavez, has put aside left rhetoric to seek accommodation with Venezuela’s biggest capitalists as well as with the Obama administration in Washington. Maduro has repeatedly charged in recent months that US imperialism was conspiring to bring down his government and was the guiding hand behind a wave of political violence that followed his narrow election victory against right-wing candidate Henrique Capriles in April. Yet Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Elias Jaua was all smiles Wednesday, following a 40-minute meeting in Guatemala with US Secretary of State John Kerry. The two, who met privately on the sidelines of the Organization of American States General Assembly meeting in Antigua, Guatemala, declared their commitment to, in Kerry’s words, “establish a more constructive and positive relationship.” This is to include resuming the exchange of ambassadors, which has been suspended since late 2010. It was Venezuela that requested the meeting. “We agreed today there will be an ongoing, continuing dialogue between the State Department and the Foreign Ministry, and we will try to set out an agenda by which we agree on things we can work together,” said Kerry. For his part, Jaua declared that “A good relationship between the government of President Nicolas Maduro and the government of President Barack Obama is what suits both peoples, it’s the guarantee of peace and stability for our peoples.” Just last month, Maduro referred to Obama in a public speech as “the big boss of the devils” and accused him of backing the “fascist right” in attacking the Venezuelan people. In Guatemala, Jaua said that he had presented Kerry with a report on the violence that followed the April 14 election to choose Chavez’s successor in which 11 people were killed and 80 injured, most of them Maduro supporters. He gave the US secretary of state an extract of the report prepared on the incidents by Venezuela’s Public Advocate’s office. He said that the discussion had “alerted Kerry to the actions of anti-democratic groups in Venezuela, which threaten Venezuelan democracy, stability and which often are being supported by political and economic sectors of other countries.” In point of fact, the most significant “sectors” seeking to destabilize the Venezuelan regime have long been the CIA and the US State Department. Maduro’s turn toward accommodation with US imperialism has been accompanied by a similar approach to both foreign and domestic capital. Among the most significant deals in terms of foreign capital was reached late last month with Chevron Corp. Chevron is providing $2 billion in financing for Petroboscan, a joint venture between the US oil giant and Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA, to boost heavy crude production in the northwestern state of Zulia. Shortly beforehand, PDVSA secured a $1 billion credit line with Houston-based Schlumberger Ltd., the world’s largest oilfield services company. While oil exports to the US have declined to about 900,000 barrels a day, it remains Venezuela’s chief customer for oil, responsible for 95 percent of the country’s export earnings and roughly half of its federal budget revenue. From the standpoint of the US-based energy conglomerates, securing dominance over Venezuela’s oil reserves, the largest in the world, remains a strategic objective. The investments by Chevron and Schlumberger make clear that they see the potential for major profits, the Venezuelan government’s rhetoric about “Bolivarian socialism” notwithstanding. Domestically, after charging for months that major Venezuelan capitalists, backed by the US, were waging an “economic war” against his government, Maduro invited the country’s second-richest individual, Lorenzo Mendoza, the head of the country’s largest food company, Polar, to meet with him last month at the Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas. Both Chavez and Maduro had singled out Polar and Mendoza for attack over the country’s increasingly severe shortages and rising food prices. Holding them responsible for hoarding and waging an “economic war,” they threatened to nationalize the firm. For his part, Mendoza, who is worth some $4.5 billion, was an enthusiastic supporter of the US-backed coup that briefly unseated Chavez in April 2002. This history had contributed to his keeping a fairly low profile under Chavez, but it was noted in the Venezuelan media that he mounted a vigorous public defense of his company in the face of Maduro’s recent charges. Mendoza described the meeting as “very cordial, direct, sincere,” adding, “The president was very kind in listening to us and communicating the need to keep investing, producing and supplying markets. That is our lifelong commitment, passion and vocation.” He said that the two had reached an agreement “not to politicize” the issue of food. Vice President Jorge Arreaza provided a similar description of the encounter between the “working class” president and the billionaire. “The problem’s been overcome,” he said. The meeting with Mendoza was only the most visible of a series of talks between the government and prominent Venezuelan capitalists. Among the deals reached is the lifting of certain price controls and the easing of currency restrictions. “In another sign of the rapprochement, the hallways of the finance ministry for the first time in years are filled with businessmen in sharp suits,” Reuters reported. “Many carry folders stuffed with requests for greater flexibility in the currency control system and an easing of price controls.” The news agency quoted Finance Minister Nelson Merentes stating after one meeting with business executives: “We’ve entered a phase of creating closer ties with the private sector, without ignoring the new socialist economy.” After months of charging the big bourgeoisie in Venezuela with “sabotage,” the Maduro government is now currying its favor and begging it to increase production. This turn is driven by a deepening economic crisis characterized by a decline in growth, soaring inflation and widespread shortages. Venezuela’s inflation rate is now near 30 percent, with the bulk of it reflecting the sharp rise in the price of food. Meanwhile, the growth rate for the first quarter of 2013 amounted to just 0.7 percent. This overall figure, however, masks the severity of the situation. Venezuela’s financial sector, which continues to enjoy some of the highest profit rates in the world, saw a 31 percent growth during this period, while manufacturing declined by 3.6 percent and construction by 1.2 percent. The scarcity index, which tracks the amount of products missing from store shelves, has hit its highest level since the Central Bank began tracking these figures. The accommodation between the Maduro government and Venezuelan capitalists, on the one hand, and Washington, on the other, has taken the political wind out of the sails of the rightist candidate Henrique Capriles, who has continued to charge electoral fraud and condemn Maduro as an illegitimate president. While the Obama administration has yet to formally recognize Maduro’s close election victory, it has turned a cold shoulder to demands for OAS sanctions against Venezuela. And Mendoza’s visit to Miraflores indicates that the billionaire accepts Maduro as legitimate. Clearly, both domestic and foreign capital recognize that behind the left rhetoric and the limited social reforms of “Bolivarian Socialism,” Maduro’s government defends capitalism and they can do business with it. More fundamentally, continued agitation by the right wing and a further weakening of the government under conditions of deepening economic crisis and rising popular discontent poses the danger of provoking a social explosion in the working class.

## 2ac china generic

**US economic ties inevitable – engagement not zero sum.**

**Dumbaugh et al 5. [**Kerry, specialist in Asian Affairs, Mark Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American affairs, "China's growing interest in Latin America" CRS Report for Congress -- April 20 -- www.au.af.mil/AU/AWC/AWCGATE/crs/rs22119.pdf]

Other observers contend that Chinese activity in Latin America is one of relatively¶ benign expansion, confined to seeking out trade and investment opportunities.17 They say¶ that the inroads China has made into the region are marginal compared with longstanding U.S. economic linkages, and they see evidence that Chinese officials have been restrained¶ in their Latin American contacts.18 They point out that U.S. trade and investment in Latin¶ America dwarfs that of China’s involvement in the region. (U.S. imports from Latin¶ America amounted to $255 billion in 2004, while U.S. cumulative direct investment in¶ Latin America in 2003 amounted to some $304 billion.19) Morever, observers contend¶ that the future growth potential of Chinese investment and trade will always be¶ constrained by the economic advantages conferred by U.S. geographic proximity to Latin¶ America. Furthermore, they indicate that migration patterns to the United States from¶ Central and South American countries have given the United States greater cultural ties¶ and longer-term economic importance to the region than China could ever have.¶ Adherents of this view maintain that the United States should avoid overreacting to¶ China’s economic initiatives in Latin America. They assert that China’s emerging¶ presence in the region is not a threat to the United Sates, but is consistent with the longstanding U.S. policy of integrating China into the world system.20

**China’s influence in Venezuela is collapsing—default risk and populist anger**

**Fillingham 13**—contributor to Geopolitical monitor (“Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?”, 2013, Zachary, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=161436>) EL

Given its precarious economic situation, Venezuela will need outside assistance in the near future. And while some would say that China is best suited to step up and bail out Caracas, there are a few reasons to question whether this will actually come to pass. First of all, The Chinese Development Bank has already provided a huge amount of money to the Chavez government, about $40 billion between 2008 and 2012 alone. Thus, if Venezuela were to be faced with a default, it would be Chinese investors with their money on the line. Any debt renegotiations would surely include provisions that didn’t sit well with the Venezuelan public. After all, there have already been agreements reached between Venezuela and the Chinese state-owned company Citic Group that have raised populist alarm bells regarding the signing of mineral rights over to foreign companies. In this context, a limited rapprochement makes sense from a Venezuelan point of view, as it would balance against a preponderance of Chinese economic influence. Now that the “Bolivarian Revolution” is all but discredited, and countries like Brazil have proven that it’s possible to alleviate poverty through trade and keep US influence at arm’s length, a US-Venezuelan thaw is theoretically possible. However, authorities in Washington will likely have to endure another round of vitriol and wait until the dust settles in Venezuelan domestic politics before their window of opportunity presents itself.

**Link turn—engagement boosts Chinese soft power**

**Ellis 12** (Dr. R. Evan Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics and is an Associate Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. “The United States, Latin America and China: A “Triangular Relationship”?” Inter-American Dialogue, May 2012, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf>)

In economic terms, the attractiveness of the US market and trade agreements between the United States and Latin American countries condition where in the region Chinese investors calculate it profitable to go. Chinese auto companies and other manufacturers investing in the Mexican maquiladora sector, for example, have been motivated in part by interest in exporting Chinese firms’ products to the US market under provisions of NAFTA.22 The possibility of countries in Latin America serving as export platforms for Chinese goods into the United States has also been mentioned in the context of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement and in the process of negotiating and securing approval for the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).23 In a more diffuse fashion, because of the close economic relationship between the United States and Latin America, US consumption and business activity that indirectly benefits Latin America enables the region to purchase Chinese products. At the level of the commercial enterprise, exports to the United States from the region may include goods sourced in China by Latin American manufacturers. At the personal level, some of the corporate earnings and salaries from these companies naturally go to the purchase of goods from the PRC, among other sources. Beyond corporations, although not traditionally considered in such terms, a portion of the approximately $50 billion in remittances sent annually to families in Latin America by immigrants living in the United States24 ultimately enables the purchase of Chinese goods in the region. The ability of the United States to serve as a market and a source of investment for Latin America has influenced the region’s receptivity toward the PRC. The initial openness of the region to promises of investment and trade by Chinese President Hu Jintao came just after Latin America reached a historic low with regard to flows of investment from the United States and other sources.25 The 2007-2009 global financial crisis, which significantly impaired US purchases of Latin American exports and US credit to the region, strengthened the perceived importance of the PRC for Latin American governments, and Chinese commodity purchases and investments emerged as one of the key factors helping these governments weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, while the PRC has occupied an important symbolic role as the largest and most visible source of new capital and markets, it has not been the only player to which Latin America has looked as the region seeks to engage globally. Attention also has been given to India and other emerging markets of Asia, as well as traditional players, such as the European Union, and actors such as Russia and Iran.

**No US-Sino war**

**Feinberg 11** (Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and Professor of International Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies in the University of California, San Diego. “CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES: CONGRUENT INTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE?” Latin American Studies Association, 2011, <http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf>)

Some realists posit that conflict, even of a violent nature, is unavoidable between rising and declining powers, citing as examples the twentieth century wars between Germany and the Allied powers, and between China and Japan. The transfer of dominance from Great Britain to the United States was more peaceful but facilitated by common political institutions and similar visions of the desirable international order, and by a demographic overlap that is largely absent from U.S.-China relations. Jack S. Levy argues that traditional power-transition theorists speak of a single, hierarchical, international system and neglect key issues in global regional interactions. Specifically, he asks, Will China compromise core strategic interests of the United States at the regional level, including in the Western Hemisphere? The simple fact of geographic distance eases the dangers that China might pose to the interests of the United States or, for that matter, of Latin America. Further, as the liberal institutionalist G. John Ikenberry suggests: “The United States is a different type of hegemonic power than past leading states—and the order it has built is different than the orders of the past. It is a wider and deeper political order than the orders of the past.” In this more optimistic view, China will surely seek a greater voice in global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization; but so long as the reigning powers are flexible and accommodate legitimate Chinese interests, tensions stemming from China’s rise can be managed, and China can be integrated into the existing world system as a “responsible stakeholder,” in the words of former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. Ultimately, human agency matters: How will individual leaders in Beijing, Washington, Brasília, and other Latin American and world capitals interpret their own long-term interests, and how will they reconcile them with the interests of others? Will they imagine zero-sum games and thereby deepen the challenges to security inherent in an anarchic international system, or will they seek to avoid mutually destructive conflicts by adjusting to new power relations and by strengthening consensual international norms?

## at: warming inev

**Avoiding a 3 degree increase solves – otherwise positive feedbacks lock in runaway warming**

**Mills 11** - \*MSc in Geological Sciences @ Cambridge

Robin, “Capturing Carbon: The New Weapon in the War Against Climate Change,” Google Book

Even if carbon dioxide emissions were to stop today, the built-in inertia in the climate system would lead to temperatures increasing further. In addition to the 0.75CC rise since the nineteenth century, we are already committed to a further warming of 0.6°C. If emissions, and hence temperatures, continue to rise, warming may be as much as 4°C by 2050—and locally much more, 15°C hotter in the Arctic and 10°C in western and southern Africa. At this level, climate impacts will become more and more serious. Extinctions are likely to increase sharply, while extreme heat-waves, forest die-offs, flooding of major river deltas, persistent severe droughts, mass migrations,33 wars and famines are all possible. We may soon pass, or already have passed, the point at which, over the next few centuries, parts of the West Ant¬arctic and Greenland ice sheets melt irreversibly, with potential sea level rises of 1.5 and 2-3 metres respectively.34 Due to feedback mechanisms and poorly understood components of global climate, there is even the possibility of a sudden, rapid catastrophic change. For example, open ocean absorbs more heat from the sun than ice. Melting permafrost''' and warming ocean bottom waters3\* release carbon dioxide and the powerful greenhouse gas methane, driving further warming. Carbon sinks will become increasingly ineffective37 as forests die off, soils dry out and warmer oceans dissolve less carbon dioxide, so that ecosystems may become net contributors of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, rather than net absorbers as today. The shade of clouds may diminish over warming oceans,38 while melting ice shelves may lead to sudden collapse of grounded ice, and hence rapid rises in sea level.w The picture is complicated further by some offsetting effects, due for instance to increased plant growth in a warmer, more C02-rich world. Changes in cloudiness, snowfall and albedo (reflectiveness) of vegetation may have warming or cooling effects. Such positive feedbacks may greatly accelerate warming. Unpre-dictable, non-linear effects can lead to prolonged droughts in the Mediterranean, California41 or West Africa,42 or to weakening of ocean circulation43 with knock-on effects including a rise in North Atlantic sea levels of up to 1 metre, a collapse of fisheries, disruption of the South Asian monsoon,44 and possibly (albeit unlikely) sharp cooling in Europe.45 Similar rapid changes are documented from Earth history, as at the end of the Ice Ages. At one time, at the end of the so-called Younger Dryas event around 12,000 years ago, Europe warmed by some 5°C within two decades.4" It seems increasingly clear, from geo¬logical studies, that the climate system is unstable and prone to abrupt transitions from one state to another, so further warming might trigger entirely unforeseen consequences.47 We should not give in to alarmism, and such disastrous shifts are thought to be unlikely—but their consequences are serious enough to be worth guarding against. This is about as far as the weight of consensus has reached,4\*1 Yet many individuals and corporations continue to deny the reality of anthropogenic climate change. The US petroleum and coal businesses, in particular certain commentators,49 and many of the general public across the world,''" continue to maintain that the climate is not warming, that elevated carbon dioxide does not cause warming, that rising carbon dioxide and temperatures are not caused by humans, that the consequences of climate change will be benign, or some combination of these positions. Beyond this understanding, there remains great uncertainty and debate on how much warming will occur for given changes in atmospheric carbon dioxide, how serious the impacts of this warming will be, how the climate will change at regional and local levels, how much it is worth spending to reduce climate change,1' exactly what types of action we should take, and how we should go about encouraging global action. Despite extensive and continuing research, these major uncertainties will persist for the foreseeable future. Some of the debate is a normative one, about the values of our civilisation, and therefore is not even capable of being solved by scientific inquiry. Such uncer-tainty and controversy, though, is not a reason for inaction. After all, we ban certain drugs suspected to be carcinogenic, without waiting for absolute proof, and we will only know the truth about some of these climate change disasters when they actually strike. I will take as my starting point here, in this fast-evolving area of research, the view that we should attempt to keep total warming below 2-3°C.52 The original goal of the EU, recommended by the Interna¬tional Climate Change Task Force, was for a maximum temperature rise of 2°C,j3 but given the delay in taking major action, and the latest science, this already seems to be very tough to achieve. Anything above 2°C is already dangerous but, with luck, avoiding rises over 3CC will prevent the most damaging effects of climate change. Otherwise, we will venture into uncharted territory, where the risk of abrupt climatic changes is high: 'Once the world has warmed by 4°C, conditions will be so different from anything we can observe today (and still more dif¬ferent from the last ice age) that it is inherently hard to say where the warming will stop.'55

**Co2 is key**

**UCS 09** (Union of Concerned Scientists, “Global Warming FAQ,” Union of Concerned Scientists, 7/14/2009, <http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/global-warming-faq.html>, ADP)

Global warming is primarily a problem of too much carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.  This carbon overload is caused mainly when we burn fossil fuels like coal, oil and gas or cut down and burn forests. There are many heat-trapping gases (from methane to water vapor), but CO2 puts us at the greatest risk of irreversible changes if it continues to accumulate unabated in the atmosphere. There are two key reasons why. CO2 has caused most of the warming and its influence is expected to continue. CO2, more than any other climate driver, has contributed the most to climate change between 1750 and 2005.[1, 2, 3] The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a global climate assessment in 2007 that compared the relative influence exerted by key heat-trapping gases, tiny particles known as aerosols, and land use change of human origin on our climate between 1750 and 2005.[3] By measuring the abundance of heat-trapping gases in ice cores, the atmosphere, and other climate drivers along with models, the IPCC calculated the “radiative forcing” (RF) of each climate driver—in other words, the net increase (or decrease) in the amount of energy reaching Earth’s surface attributable to that climate driver. Positive RF values represent average surface warming and negative values represent average surface cooling. CO2 has the highest positive RF (see Figure 1) of all the human-influenced climate drivers compared by the IPCC. Other gases have more potent heat-trapping ability molecule per molecule than CO2 (e.g. methane), but are simply far less abundant in the atmosphere and being added more slowly.

## prolif

**Prolif will be slow – the risk is basically zero**

**Tepperman 09 –** [Jonathan, Newsweek International's first Assistant Managing Editor (now Deputy Editor), “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb” 8-29, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html, SM]

The risk of an arms race—with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one—is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; that's spread at glacial pace." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors—Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say—might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.

**New proliferators will build small arsenals – solves the impact**

**Seng 98 –** [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.203-206]

However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage chose arsenals will be small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number of people 'in the loop' greatly diminishes the statistical probability that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care, 7 and to keep each of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World stares simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of. Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be flexible in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in nuclear launch processes is that the full range if possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mismatched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to “get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that all launch operators could be contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once one organizational event is triggered—once an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is made—other branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as interactive complexity, 8 and it has been a mainstay in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control s ystems.9 The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, tight coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may nor have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do nor 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

## fdi kt econ

**Tentori and Zandonini 2013** (Davide Tentori, Visiting Researcher Int’l Economics at Chatham House. Myriam Zandonini, Research Assistant Int’l Economics at Chatham House. “The Transatlantic Relationship And The Future Global Governance; Trends and Leadership Challenges in the Evolution of the Global Economic System”; Working Paper 09; March 2013; [www.iai.it/pdf/Transworld/TW\_WP\_09.pdf](http://www.iai.it/pdf/Transworld/TW_WP_09.pdf); JRS)

Increasing steadily since the end of World War II, global trade rose from only 59 US billion dollar in 1948 up to 17.8 US trillion dollar in 2011 current prices (WTO 2012). In the last seven years trade increased with an annual growth rate of 3.5 percent. Nevertheless, trade patterns have been heavily affected by economic instability and

do not seem able to follow a clear trend. Dropping almost five times more than the fall in world GDP, the “sudden, severe and synchronised […] great trade collapse” of 2009 (Baldwin 2009), which was caused by a demand shock following the crisis the year before, was amplified by consumers’ uncertainty and concerned almost all world regions.

Unsurprisingly, China and emerging economies are mainly responsible for the increase in global trade. As a whole, South America recorded the highest increase in exports performance, with an annual 10 percent in the period 2005-2011. Led by a labour intensive manufacturing sector for export markets (a thoroughly conceived and implemented strategy of economic growth by the government), the Chinese economy overtook Germany and became the second largest exporter in 2009, expanding six times since it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.

The world economy has undoubtedly become increasingly more open. Tariff barriers have mostly been removed, at least among developed economies, while forms of protectionism, both in terms of tariff and non tariff barriers, still tend to persist among developing countries (Mohan, Khorana and Choudhury 2012). Although an agreement within the WTO might sustain the process of global economic recovery at least by increasing security in international trade relations, efforts towards further multilateral reductions have come to a halt following the failure of the Doha round on global trade liberalization in 2011 and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) mushroomed.

At present, there are 243 PTAs in force (WTO 2012) and they are generally bilateral agreements or take the form of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). While the most famous RTA is the European Community Treaty (ECT), RTAs have proliferated in Latin America and Asia and in both the EU’s and the US’s trade relations with developing countries. The dominance of this approach seems to represent the only way to push forward the global process of trade liberalization at the moment. However, the multiplicity of bilateral trade agreements is inefficient and detrimental to the global economic system, since overlapping PTAs and the lack of clear and unanimously agreed rules cause uncertainty (Tussie and Quiliconi 2005; Baldwin 2006). Provided that new efforts are made to restart the multilateral approach to trade liberalization, it would take years to achieve a widespread agreement. Bilateralism – or, at best, regionalism – is likely to be the key approach for further trade negotiations.

**Li and Liu 2005** ([Xiaoying Li](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X04002013), Univ of Nottingham, UK; [Xiaming Liu](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X04002013), Univ of Surrey, UK; “Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: An Increasingly Endogenous Relationship”; [World Development](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0305750X); Vol 33, Issue 3, March 2005, 393–407; [www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X04002013](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X04002013); JRS)

5. Conclusions This study investigates the impact of FDI on economic growth in both developed and developing countries using a large crosscountry sample for the period 1970–99. The test results suggest that endogeneity between FDI and economic growth does not exist for the whole sample period. Only from the mid-1980s, do FDI and economic growth become significantly complementary to each other and form an increasingly endogenous relationship. Thus, the single equations are used for the full sample, and simultaneous-equation systems are applied for the subsamples covering the period 1985–99.

This study shows that there is a strong complementary connection between FDI and economic growth in both developed and developing countries. Furthermore, FDI not only directly promotes economic growth by itself but also indirectly does so via its interaction terms. There is a strong positive interaction effect of FDI with human capital and a strong negative interaction effect of FDI with the technology gap on economic growth in developing countries.

The empirical results from this study lend strong support to new FDI and economic growth theories, as they confirm that inward FDI tends to be attracted to any host country with a large market size. In addition, human capital and technology-absorptive ability are very important for inward FDI to positively promote economic growth in developing countries. The policy implications of this study are relatively straightforward. As FDI and economic growth have become increasingly endogenously related, the promotion of human capital, technological capabilities, and economic development will lead to more FDI inflows. This in turn will promote further economic growth and enhance competitiveness.

## 2ac – t-no qpq

**\*Counter-interpretation --- “Economic engagement” can be unconditional or conditional**

**Kahler 4** – Miles Kahler, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, and Scott L. Kastner Department of Government and Politics University of Maryland, “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies in South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan”, November, http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/kastner/KahlerKastner.doc

Economic engagement—a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and effect an improvement in bilateral political relations—is the subject of growing, but still limited, interest in the international relations literature. The bulk of the work on economic statecraft continues to focus on coercive policies such as economic sanctions. The emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well-documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa 1994; Pollins 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how widespread strategies of economic engagement actually are: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno 2003). Furthermore, beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies in this regard have focused on policies adopted by great powers. But engagement policies adopted by South Korea and the other two states examined in this study, Singapore and Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics; instead, it may be more widespread than previously recognized. We begin by developing a theoretical framework through which to examine strategies of economic engagement. Drawing from the existing literature, our framework distinguishes between different forms of economic engagement, and outlines the factors likely to facilitate or undermine the implementation of these different strategies. With this framework as a guide, we then examine the strategic use of economic interdependence—focusing in particular on economic engagement—in three East Asian States: South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. We use these case studies to draw conclusions about the underlying factors that facilitate the use of a strategy of economic engagement, that determine the particular type of engagement strategy used, and that help to predict the likelihood of success. Because our conclusions are primarily derived inductively from a small number of cases, we are cautious in making claims of generalizability. Nonetheless, it is our hope that the narratives we provide and the conclusions that we draw from them will help to spur further research into this interesting yet under-studied subject. ECONOMIC ENGAGMENT: STRATEGIES AND EXPECTATIONS Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid-pro-quo on the part of the target country, and policies that are unconditional. Conditional policies, sometimes called “linkage” or economic “carrots,” are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with a sanction absent a change in policy, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic flows in exchange for policy change. Drezner’s (1999/2000) analysis of conditional economic inducements yields a set of highly plausible expectations concerning when conditional strategies are likely to be employed, and when they are likely to succeed. Specifically, he suggests that reasons exist to believe, a priori, that policies of conditional engagement will be less prevalent than economic sanctions. First, economic coercion is costly if it fails (sanctions are only carried out if the target country fails to change policy), while conditional engagement is costly if it succeeds (economic payoffs are delivered only if the target country does change policy). Second, states may be reluctant to offer economic inducements with adversaries with whom they expect long-term conflict, as this may undermine their resolve in the eyes of their opponent while also making the opponent stronger. Third, the potential for market failure in an anarchic international setting looms large: both the initiating and the target states must be capable of making a credible commitment to uphold their end of the bargain. These factors lead Drezner to hypothesize that the use of economic carrots is most likely to occur and succeed between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because such regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used. Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive in that they do not include a specific quid-pro-quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, effect change in the target’s foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict at the bilateral level. How increased commercial and/or financial integration at the bilateral level might yield an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus exists regarding how such effects are realized. At a minimum, two causal pathways exist that state leaders might seek to exploit by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that helps to reshape the goals of the target state. Perhaps the most widely accepted theoretical link between economic integration and a reduced danger of military violence centers on the constraints imposed on state behavior by increasing economic exchange. Once established, a disruption in economic relations between countries would be costly on two levels. First, firms might lose assets that could not readily be redeployed elsewhere. For example, direct investments cannot easily be moved, and may be lost (i.e. seized or destroyed) if war breaks out. Second, firms engaged in bilateral economic exchange would be forced to search for next-best alternatives, which could impose significant costs on an economy as a whole if bilateral commercial ties are extensive. In short, economic interdependence makes war more costly, meaning that states will be less likely to initiate armed conflict against countries with which they are integrated economically. Constraining effects of economic interdependence may also arise more indirectly: as economic integration between two countries increases, an increasing number of economic actors within those two countries benefit directly from bilateral economic ties, who in turn are likely to support—and lobby for—stable bilateral political relations. Economic integration, in other words, creates vested interests in peace (Hirschman 1945; Russett and Oneal 2001; Levy 2003). These interests are likely to become more influential as economic ties grow (Rogowski 1989), suggesting that leaders will pay increasing domestic political costs for implementing policies that destabilize bilateral political relations. Domestic political institutions might act as important intervening variables here. For example, these effects may be most likely to take effect in democracies, which provide actors who benefit from trade clear paths through which to influence the political process (Papayoanou 1999; Gelpi and Grieco 2003; Russett and Oneal 2001). Democracies, of course, likely vary in the influence they give to commercial interests, as do authoritarian polities (e.g. Papayoanou and Kastner 1999/2000). Recently, scholars have questioned whether the increased costs of military conflict associated with economic interdependence necessarily act as a constraint on state leaders. Indeed, without further assumptions, the effects appear indeterminate: while economic interdependence increases the costs of conflict for the target state, it also increases those costs for the engaging state. On the one hand, increased costs for the target might make it less willing to provoke conflict, but on the other hand, the increased costs for the engaging state may paradoxically embolden the target state, believing it could get away with more before provoking a strong response (Morrow 1999, 2003; Gartzke 2003; Gartzke et al. 2001). This critique suggests that for an unconditional engagement policy exploiting the constraining effects of economic interdependence to work, leaders in the target state must value the benefits afforded by economic integration more than leaders in the initiating state (on this point, see also Abdelal and Kirshner 1999/2000). Such asymmetry is most likely to arise when the target state’s economy depends more heavily on bilateral economic exchange than the sending state (Hirschman 1945), and when domestic political institutions in the target state give the benefactors of bilateral exchange considerable political influence (Papayoanou and Kastner 1999/2000). The second mechanism through which economic interdependence might effect improved political relations centers on elite transformation that reshapes state strategies. This transformation can be defined as both an elevation at the national level of goals of economic welfare (and a concurrent devaluation of the old values of military status and territorial acquisition) and a systemic transformation of values away from the military orientation of the Westphalian order. Such arguments have a long heritage, including both Joseph Schumpeter's analysis of imperialism as an atavism that would be superseded by more pacific bourgeois values, and interwar idealists, who sometimes based their arguments on the material transformations underway in the international system. How economic interdependence creates transformed (and more pacific) elites is less clear. Learning may take place at the individual level—the cases of Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping come to mind—but such learning must often take place before policy encourages increased interdependence. Processes of creating shared values and identity and economic influences on broader social learning are more difficult to trace. A different and perhaps more plausible transformational route follows from the vested interests argument outlined above. What appears to be social learning is in effect coalitional change: internationalist elites committed to economic openness and international stability supplant or marginalize nationalist elites wedded to the threat or use of military force. Whether a society is a pluralist democracy or not, interests tied to the international economy become a critical part of the selectorate to whom political elites must respond. Etel Solingen (1998) outlines such a model of transformation in regional orders when strong internationalist coalitions committed to economic liberalization create zones of stable peace. The barriers to a successful unconditional engagement strategy that aims to achieve elite transformation in the target state would appear substantial. Strategies in this vein are likely to encounter substantial resistance in the target state: most elites probably don’t want to be “transformed,” and they certainly don’t want to be replaced. Faced with likely resistance, initiating states pursuing this strategy must be prepared to open economic links unilaterally (i.e. without the cooperation of the target), hoping that the prospect of bilateral economic ties will generate a latent coalition of groups desiring a peaceful environment in which they could take advantage of those ties, and that eventually a political entrepreneur will mobilize this latent coalition in an effort to challenge the existing order. Because transformational strategies may require long time horizons and may also incur repeated disappointments, they are perhaps most likely to be successful when a broad and stable consensus—one able to withstand changes in governing party—exists within the country initiating such a strategy (see, for example, Davis 1999). In summary, we have distinguished between three types of economic engagement: conditional engagement (linkage); unconditional engagement seeking to utilize the constraining effects of economic interdependence; and unconditional engagement seeking to utilize the transforming effects of economic interdependence. We have also outlined a number of expectations, mostly drawn from the existing literature, regarding the conditions likely to facilitate the use of these various strategies. In the remainder of this essay we examine the engagement policies of South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, and we use these cases to draw conclusions concerning the conditions facilitating the strategic use of economic interdependence.

## 2ac democracy conditions

**Negotiate means to discuss and compromise**

**Merriam Webster Online no date**—“negotiate”, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negotiate>) EL

Full Definition of NEGOTIATE intransitive verb : to confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter transitive verb 1 a : to deal with (some matter or affair that requires ability for its successful handling) : manage b : to arrange for or bring about through conference, discussion, and compromise <negotiate a treaty> 2 a : to transfer (as a bill of exchange) to another by delivery or endorsement b : to convert into cash or the equivalent value <negotiate a check> 3 a : to successfully travel along or over <negotiate a turn> b : complete, accomplish <negotiate the trip in two hours>

**Venezuela says no and the CPs net worse than the plan.**

**Fernandez 13** (Yusuf, the secretary of the Muslim Federation of Spain, 3/22/13, “Venezuela rejects US interference, bent on treading Chavez path,” http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/03/22/294784/venezuela-rejects-us-interference/)//DR. H

However, as all the whole world could see, it is the US and Canadian governments, and not Chavez, who are isolated in the continent. Fellow presidents from throughout the Americas went to Caracas to attend the funeral and pay homage to Chavez. There, many of them reaffirmed their support for the ideals of social justice and regional development and independence that the Venezuelan leader supported during his whole life. Many messages of sympathy and solidarity arrived in Caracas from Mexico to Argentina. Several Latin American leaders said that even in the absence of the Leader of the Boliviarian Revolution, they would keep on working together in order to develop Chavez ideals on Latin American independence and integration that have already been successfully implemented. Even José Manual Santos, the President of Colombia - a former enemy of Venezuela during the rule of the former President Alvaro Uribe - praised the commitment of President Hugo Chavez and the Venezuelan government to the peace process in his country. In stark contrast to the warm tributes from the whole Latin America, statements by US President Barack Obama were seen as full of contempt for Chavez, which is certainly consistent with past attitudes of his government towards Venezuela and Latin America´s growing independence. Obama spoke of “a new chapter of the history of Venezuela” and, as if Venezuela was a dictatorial country, he added that the US “remains committed to policies that promote the democratic principles, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.” Obama did not offer his condolences for the death of Chavez either. Actually, Obama should know best. Venezuelans, according to polls, give their own democracy a score of 7 out of 10 while the Latin American average is 5.8. While 81 percent voted in the last Venezuelan election, only 57.5 percent voted in the last US presidential election in 2012. For her part, spokeswoman for the US State Department, Victoria Nuland, told the media that her government was waiting for a decision by the Venezuelan authorities about the “transition;” that is, she was telling the Venezuelans that Washington wants them to backtrack and basically eliminate their independence and social achievements. However, in a statement, the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry described Nuland´s insolent and disrespectful remarks as “a new, crude US interference in Venezuela's internal affairs.” At the same time, all these [negative] remarks [about Chavez] by US top officials sparked profound outrage among Venezuelan people, who accompanied their president with affection and sorrow during the funeral. Obama´s vilification of Chavez offended the majority of Venezuelans, both those who voted to reelect their president on October 7 and those who did not. It is not the first time, however, that Obama has found himself isolated. At the 2012 OAS Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, the US and Canada were harshly criticized, especially for their refusal to allow Cuba to attend. It was a stark contrast to the previous summit in 2009, where Latin American leaders - including Chavez - welcomed Obama warmly because they wrongly thought that he could open a new era in the history of the US-Latin American relations. Maduro accuses Shortly after Chavez passed away, the Venezuelan government expelled the air force attaché of the US Embassy in Caracas and his deputy, claiming that they had made “inappropriate contacts” with Venezuelan military officers in order to try to destabilize the country. The United States retaliated by expelling the second secretary at the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington and another diplomat. Finally, the Venezuelan government has ordered an investigation to know whether Chavez´s cancer was induced by the enemies of his Bolivarian revolution, especially the US administration. For his part, Acting President Nicolas Maduro has promised to follow Chavez path and to confront “the Empire´s attempts to prevent Venezuela and Latin America´s independence from consolidating.” He recently announced that “some people in the Pentagon and the CIA” were conspiring as the election approaches in the South American country. “I am telling the absolute truth,” Maduro said, “because we have the testimonies and direct, firsthand information.” He accused explicitly a group of former US officials -including Roger Noriega, Otto Reich and John Negroponte - of working to destabilize Venezuela. Shortly after, Maduro added that Venezuela had detected a plot from those same circles to kill his opponent in the election Henrique Capriles Randoski. The implication was that the attack on the right-wing candidate would be a provocation in order to create a chaos in the country. Maduro did not give more details. Otto Reich was ambassador in Venezuela from 1986 to 1989 and Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs in the administration of George W. Bush. He was deeply involved in the 2002 anti-Chavez coup in Venezuela. He was a close friend to right-wing Venezuelan businessman and lawyer Robert Carmona-Borjas, who fled from the Latin American country shortly after the failure of the coup in which he was also heavily involved. A second individual denounced by Maduro was Robert Noriega, US permanent representative to the Organization of American States, Noriega also supported the 2002 failed coup. After the Honduran military coup in 2009, Noriega became a lobbyist for the new regime. The third individual, John Negroponte, was Director of National Intelligence and was actively involved in the contra war against the Sandinist Nicaragua in the 1980s. It is worth pointing out that these three individuals have written numerous articles in which they called on the US administration to take a tough line against Venezuela. All these events show that the Obama Administration continues to develop the same failed Cold War policies towards Latin America that George W. Bush put into practice. Washington keeps militarizing much of the continent and spending enormous amounts of cash in order to set up obedient governments, train armies and militias, deploy troops, and build new military bases in countries such as Guatemala, Panama, Belize, Honduras or the Dominican Republic. Re-imposing the old order It is worth pointing out that Obama and Nuland´s speeches are in line with the political discourse of Venezuelan corrupt and aggressive right wing, which again shows the links of subordination of the latter to US policies. The Venezuelan oligarchy helped the US push its neoliberal agenda on Venezuela through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as it did in the rest of Latin America. In 1989, then President Carlos Andres Perez was putting into practice the “Washington Consensus” of neoliberal policies - privatization and cuts to social services - and, consequently, ended subsidies for oil and the prices of gasoline and public transportation doubled. Protests broke out in the suburbs surrounding Caracas and spread into the capital itself. Carlos Andrés Perez then revoked the constitutional right to protest and deployed military, who killed an estimated 3,000 people. On the whole, under President Perez, life standards continued to decline for all but the richest. However, Chavez took Venezuelan people out of poverty. He used the nation´s oil revenues to provide funds for literacy programs and, in this way, more people were able to go to university. The Venezuelan government extended access to dental and health care and promoted a land and housing reform, subsidized supermarkets, and thousands of work cooperatives. In Venezuela, where much of the population had been living below the poverty line, these programs have had a huge impact. Nowadays, Venezuela´s gap between rich and poor is half of what it is in the United States. It has been rated “the fifth-happiest nation in the world” by Gallup. In unity with his people, he was also able to free the country from the grips of the United States and was the promoter of a Latin American uprising against US domination. Chavez led the way to create to the Bank of the South in order to finance projects throughout Latin America and allow other nations to free themselves from the yoke of the IMF and the World Bank. From local councils to factories, Venezuela has carried out one of the most successful experiments in direct democracy and worker control in the world, which makes it a much more democratic country than the US itself, where poor and ordinary people are excluded from politics and decision-making, and the very wealthy rule the country through a managed and formal democracy that ensures that they will benefit most from the economy. In this sense, while Chavez was a key figure in the creation and development of these programs and initiatives, it is the Venezuelan people that brought them to life and will keep them alive after his death. The slogan, “Chavez somos todos’ - We are all Chavez - is not mere words, but expresses the consciousness of people, who want this process to go on.” Recently a Venezuelan told a foreign media: “The Americans and the opposition believe that if Chavez as a person disappears, the revolution will be over and the old order will be re-imposed, but we have to show them that it will not be like that.”

## race k

**Omission is not exclusion—no discursive act can include everything. It doesn’t mean we reject these concerns, but that our discursive act should be read in many ways**

**Rorty 2002** - professor of comparative literature at Stanford (Richard, Peace Review, v. 14, n.2, ebsco)

I have no quarrel with Cornell’s and Spivak’s claim that “what is missing in a literary text or historical narrative leaves its mark through the traces of its expulsion.” For that seems simply to say that any text will presuppose the existence of people, things, and institutions that it hardly mentions. So the readers of a literary text will always be able to ask themselves questions such as: “Who prepared the sumptuous dinner the lovers enjoyed?” “How did they get the money to afford that meal?” The reader of a historical narrative will always be able to wonder about where the money to finance the war came from and about who got to decide whether the war would take place. “Expulsion,” however, seems too pejorative a term for the fact that no text can answer all possible questions about its own background and its own presuppositions. Consider Captain Birch, the agent of the East Indian Company charged with persuading the Rani of Sirmur not to commit suicide. Spivak is not exactly “expelling” Captain Birch from her narrative by zeroing in on the Rani, even though she does not try to find out much about Birch’s early days as a subaltern, nor about the feelings of pride or shame or exasperation he may have experienced in the course of his conversations with the Rani. In the case of Birch, Spivak does not try to “gently blow precarious ashes into their ghostly shape,” nor does she speculate about the possible sublimity of his career. Nor should she. Spivak has her own fish to fry and her own witness to bear, just as Kipling had his when he spun tales of the humiliations to which newly arrived subalterns were subjected in the regimental messes of the Raj. So do all authors of literary texts and historical narratives, and such texts and narratives should not always be read as disingenuous exercises in repression. They should be read as one version of a story that could have been told, and should be told, in many other ways.

econstructing is relatively easy and painless. After a while, the outcome of this activity – as de Man came early to realize – is quite predictable. On the other hand, creating better alternatives to our current ideals, practices and identities is neither easy nor painless: it unavoidably involves cognitive, ethical and political struggle, the success of which can hardly be guaranteed in advance. The normative demand that we can ‘destroy only as creators’ arises from Nietzsche’s justified suspicion of the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’, a suspicion which issues not in irony but in insight. It can be glossed as follows: we must be as critically vigilant of the spirit that moves us to profane our ideals as we are of the spirit that impels us to divinize our ideals – as critically vigilant of our deflationary as of our inflationary impulses. Critique that focuses its activity exclusively on the practice of unmasking has become unbalanced, out of tune: And as for our future, one will hardly find us again on the paths of those Egyptian youths who endanger temples by night, embrace statues, and want by all means to unveil, uncover and put into a bright light whatever is kept concealed for good reasons. No, this bad taste, this will to truth, to ‘truth at any price’, this youthful madness in the love of truth, have lost their charm for us. . . . We no longer believe that truth remains truth when the veils are withdrawn; we have lived too much to believe this. Today we consider it a matter of decency not to wish to see everything naked, or to be present at everything, or to understand and ‘know’ everything.54

**All lives infinitely valuable—only ethical option is maximizing number saved**

**Cummisky, 96** (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed this way—this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of one. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.

## ptx- rr

**Won’t pass – base opposition and no moderates**

**Gandelman, 9/18/13** – (Joe, “Republicans all in: government shutdown by Repubicans virtually certain” <http://themoderatevoice.com/186749/republicans-all-in-government-shutdown-by-repubicans-virtually-certain/>)

It’s going to happen. You can bet on it. Republicans now seem all in – despite some pesky noises from they-must-be-RINO websites such as the Wall Street Journal and the National Review about the dangers — to set the stage for a government shut down. And don’t be surprised if it then gets worse and House Republicans engineer a default on the debt ceiling as well:

House Republicans are moving forward with a government funding bill that would defund ObamaCare.

The legislation is a nod to House conservatives, some of whom quickly backed the plan.

But Senate Democrats and the White House have promised to reject any legislation that would defund the healthcare law, meaning the legislation won’t move farther than the House.

Unless the House and Senate can agree on legislation and get it to the White House by Oct. 1, the government will shut down at that time.

Basically, the GOP House leadership is politically twerking its powerful Tea Party sympathetic members. But the consquences to many Americans that even a brief shutdown would bring could be huge.

And who says this will necessarily be a brief shutdown?

The House measure would keep the government funded through Dec. 15 at the current $986 billion spending rate, rather than the lower $967 billion level called for in the 2011 Budget Control Act.

GOP leaders also announced Wednesday that they will condition a debt ceiling increase on a one-year delay of ObamaCare, approval of the Keystone XL pipeline and an outline for tax reform.

In other words:

Republicans are going to use political extortion — hurting the United States’s economy — if they can’t get policies that they are unable to get by winning elections or putting together coalitions in Congress. It’s a tough choice for Barack Obama and the Democrats: if this is allowed to happen it will fundamentally change the form of American democracy.

Republican Study Committee Chairman Steve Scalise (R-La.) said he was on board with the plan despite the higher spending level.

“This reflects the principles we’ve been pushing for,” he said. “We want to address ObamaCare directly in the CR. We want to address ObamaCare in the debt ceiling and this keeps both of those moving.”

Yes — in a way unprecedented in American democracy. And:

Rep. Tom Graves (R-Ga.), who authored a one-year CR that would increase defense spending while defunding ObamaCare, said he would vote for the new Boehner plan.

“It’s a step in the right direction,” Graves said. “The American people should view this as a victory.”

I agree with Booman: there is a notable lack of adults in the Republican room, and a notably large number of conservative talk show host followers and Tea Party members. Booman:

It’s a two-pronged approach. On the continuing resolution (CR) to fund the government, the Republicans will limit the funding to December 15th. The funding level will be slightly above what the Budget Control Act of 2011 calls for. And it will defund ObamaCare.

On the debt ceiling, they will have a separate vote that will delay ObamaCare for a year, authorize the Keystone XL pipeline, and provide an outline for tax reform.

Their hope is that they can successfully pass the buck to Republican senators who will be expected to sustain a filibuster against any CR or debt ceiling hike that includes money for health care.

It really doesn’t matter whether the Senate Republicans go along with the plan or not, because the government will shut down either way and we will default on our debts either way.

The pressure on Republican senators will be intense, but they’d rather let the House take the blame for the catastrophe.

The fact that the Senate Minority Leader, Mitch McConnell, is facing a primary challenge from his right makes it unlikely that he will ride to the House’s rescue this time around. If we’re hoping for adult leadership in the Senate, it will have to come from a rump of moderate Republican senators that doesn’t seem to exist.

Plan popular **– Chavez’s death changed the equation their ev is too old**

**Spetalnick ‘13**

Matt Spetalnick – White House correspondent who has covered news on four continents for Reuters, from Latin American coups and drug wars – Reuter’s – March 6th, 2013 – “Despite new hopes, U.S. treads cautiously after death of Venezuela's Chavez” – http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/uk-venezuela-chavez-usa-idUKBRE92504920130306

Washington's challenge will be to figure out how far to go in seizing the opening to engage with Venezuelan leaders as well as its political opposition without giving the impression of U.S. meddling following the socialist president's death after a two-year battle with cancer. "We're not interested in having a confrontational relationship with Venezuela," a senior U.S. official told Reuters. "We're going to have to see how things evolve. It's a dynamic period." For Washington, a major test will be whether Venezuela follows its own constitution - which has been widely interpreted to require a special election to pick Chavez's successor - and if such a vote is conducted in a free and fair way in "accordance with hemispheric norms," the official said. Washington had accused Chavez and his allies of electoral abuses, such as intimidating foes and misusing state media during his 14-year rule. Chavez had created headaches for successive U.S. administrations with his strong anti-American rhetoric and his alliances with some of Washington's main foes, including Cuba and Iran. The question now is whether his leftist "revolution" and incendiary foreign policy can live on without his dominant personality at the helm. In a normally divided Washington, Chavez's death brought a rare moment of bipartisan agreement, with Republicans and Democrats alike seeing it as a chance to turn a page after a long period of strained U.S.-Venezuelan ties.

**Prefer qualified evidence – PC doesn’t influence Congress**

**Dickinson 9** professor of political science at Middlebury College (Matthew, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,” May 26, 2009 Presidential Power <http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/>]

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

**PC isn’t key—their uq ev says Republicans have no incentive to cause default**

**Klein, 9/18/13 -** columnist at the Washington Post, as well as a contributor to MSNBC. His work focuses on domestic and economic policymaking,(Ezra, Washington Post, “The White House doesn’t think it can prevent a government shutdown” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/18/the-white-house-doesnt-think-it-can-prevent-a-government-shutdown/>)

And there is a difference between 2011 and 2013. Two of them, in fact.

1) In 2011, the White House knew whom to deal with. Back then, House Speaker John Boehner actually did seem reasonably in sync with his party on these issues, and so the White House was able to negotiate with Republican leadership on a deal. Today, the relevant negotiations are happening in the Republican Party, with GOP leadership trying to fight conservatives who want to shut down the government, and no one knows who actually has the power to cut and close a deal.

2) In 2011, the White House was willing to deal. The White House believed, in its gut, that Republicans had been given a mandate in the 2010 elections to extract exactly the kind of concessions they were demanding. In addition, the White House believed President Obama would be a likelier bet for reelection if he could cut a "grand bargain" with the newly resurgent Republicans, taking their key issue away from them.

This year, it's the White House that won the last election, and so they see no popular legitimacy behind Republican demands. In addition, they are deeply, fervently committed to the proposition that they will never again negotiate around the debt ceiling, as that's a tactic history will judge them harshly for repeatedly enabling. So even if Boehner could cut a deal on the debt ceiling, the White House isn't open to negotiating.

All of which helps explain the White House's more alarmist communications strategy. In 2011, the White House was confident they could cut a deal with Republicans and, in some ways, eager to do so. That gave them a sense of control over the situation.

This year, they're not willing to cut a deal with the Republicans on the debt ceiling, and they're not sure the Republicans can cut a deal with themselves on funding the government, all of which means the White House doesn't have much control over this situation. That's why they're trying to worry business and Wall Street and other outside actors who could put pressure on the GOP.

**Winners win—Bush proves**

**Fortier 9** [John, Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, January 14th, *Spend Your Political Capital Before It's Gone*, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0109/17395.html]

Bush came into the presidency after a protracted election dispute but acted like a man with a mandate. His election victory, no matter how small, was a form of political capital to be spent, and he pushed his tax and education reform packages through Congress. After the Sept. 11 attacks, Republican victories in the 2002 midterm election and the initial phase of the Iraq war, Bush gained more political capital. And each time, he spent it, going to Congress for more tax cuts, the creation of a Department of Homeland Security and other domestic priorities. Bush developed the image of a winner. Despite narrow Republican majorities in Congress, he succeeded in holding his party together and pulling out one legislative victory after another. He famously did not veto a bill in his first term. Even when Bush veered from a typical conservative agenda on education reform and Medicare prescription drugs, Republicans voted with him, although some held their noses. Republicans in Congress did not want to break the string of Bush’s first-term legislative juggernaut. Bush was spending his political capital and, by winning, was getting repaid. Bush’s 2004 reelection was the apex of his presidency. He won a spirited, high- turnout contest by a clear margin, he brought more Republicans to Congress, and he was ready to spend his latest cache of political capital on two big domestic priorities: Social Security reform and tax reform. But 2005 saw Bush lose all of his political capital. His domestic priorities were bold, but he had overreached and did not have plans that Congress could get to work on immediately. The legislative vacuum in Congress stood in contrast to Bush’s first term, where Congress was almost always busy at work on Bush priorities. More importantly, conditions in Iraq deteriorated, and the public began to lose confidence in the president and his ability to win the war. Bush himself said that he had spent his political capital in Iraq and had lost it there. Republican scandals and the president’s lack of leadership immediately after Hurricane Katrina further damaged Bush. The winning streak was over, the president’s job approval numbers had dropped and his days setting the legislative agenda were over. Even though Bush had his biggest Republican majorities in the 109th Congress, Republican leaders staked out their own agenda, not wanting to tie themselves to a now unpopular president. Bush never regained political capital after 2005. Ronald Reagan had early heady days when he controlled the agenda; his popularity waned, but he was able to regain his footing. Bill Clinton famously bounced from highs to lows and back again. But for Bush, there was no second act. Reagan and Clinton could counterpunch and thrive as president without control of Congress. The Bush presidency had only two settings: on and off. In his first term, Bush controlled the legislative agenda like a prime minister; in the second, others set the agenda. President-elect Barack Obama won election more convincingly than Bush, and he will have larger congressional majorities than Republicans had. No doubt he will begin with some political capital of his own. But as the Bush presidency has taught us, that capital will run out someday, and a real test of leadership will be how Obama adjusts.

**No default impact – it’s political hype**

**Boccia, 9/18/13 –** fellow in federal budgetary affairs at the Heritage Foundation(Romina, “Debt Limit: Options and the Way Forward” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/debt-limit-options-and-the-way-forward>)

If Congress does not raise the debt limit by mid-October, the Treasury would not necessarily default on debt obligations. Even while cash-strapped, the Treasury can reasonably be expected to prioritize principal and interest payments

 on the national debt, protecting the full faith and credit of the United States above all other spending. It is almost impossible to conceive that the Treasury and the President would choose to default on debt obligations because doing so would have damaging economic consequences.

Nevertheless, the Treasury and the President have repeatedly invoked the threat of default to pressure Congress into raising the debt ceiling without substantial spending cuts and policy reforms. In July, Secretary Lew said on ABC’s This Week: “Congress can’t let us default. Congress has to do its work.”[6] On August 26, he wrote to Congress: “Congress should act as soon as possible to protect America’s good credit by extending normal borrowing authority well before any risk of default becomes imminent.”[7] President Obama also mentioned default at the G-20 summit: “That includes making sure we don’t risk a U.S. default over paying bills we’ve already racked up.”[8 ]